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ABSTRACT
This Article presents original data and analysis addressing an
understudied force in corporate America: the most patient and
focused shareholders. Great attention has been devoted to shortterm trading on the one hand and diversified index funds on the
other,1 but scant attention has been focused on long-term
concentrated investors. The George Washington University has
been redressing this problem through a research initiative focused
on such buy-and-hold stock pickers, whom Warren Buffett long ago
dubbed “quality shareholders.”2 GW’s Quality Shareholders
Initiative3 (“QSI”) is pleased to present highlights of the initial
installment of this work in this Article in the Business and Finance
Law Review at the George Washington University’s Center for Law,
Economics, and Finance.
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INTRODUCTION
Our original motivation for the QSI arose from the growing size and
power of institutional investors, among the most important contemporary
trends in American corporate life. Lively debates contest whether such
powerful investors have the right vision or conviction to faithfully discharge
the trust so many Americans have placed in them.4 On vision, participants
have long debated whether investors, especially activists, are too short-term
oriented to enable managers and markets to maintain a long-term view.5 On
conviction, debaters ask whether certain kinds of investors, particularly
passive indexers, have sufficient incentives to actively monitor managers to
promote performance and accountability.6
These are vital discussions in corporate America, implicating
fundamental questions of the balance of power between directors and
shareholders as well as among shareholders. As such, they stoke numerous
sub-debates on every aspect of corporate governance, such as board
structures, director-officer relationships, shareholder rights, and corporate
purpose—all with wide-ranging effects on the national economy.7 Although
such debates are sophisticated, increasingly data-driven, and involve
overlapping participants, they suffer from a false binary: the horizon debate
juxtaposes short-term against long-term but mutes conviction, while the
conviction debate juxtaposes passive against active investment styles but
mutes horizon.
In fact, however, while time horizon and relative conviction are
important, neither alone captures the nuanced reality of investor behavior
which involves both features simultaneously. The QSI incorporates such
concurrent analysis of horizon and conviction by incorporating both as
embodied in quality shareholders (“QSs”).
While contemporary data suggest that a large plurality of
institutional shareholders qualify as short-term and another plurality as
indexers, the QS cohort remains a significant force in market and corporate
behavior. It should accordingly be given an important place in debates over
horizon and conviction—as well as all areas concerning shareholder voice.
4

See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal Investor, 41 SEATTLE L. REV. 425
(2018).
5 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius
Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance,
41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 545, 572-573 (2016).
6 See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019).
7 E.g., John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of
Twelve (Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), www.ssrn.com/abstract=3247337.
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The QSI’s efforts in this regard began with the book, Quality Shareholders,
outlining the motivation, history and preliminary data on the cohort and the
companies and practices that attract them.8 A series of journal articles
followed.
The first made the case to empower QSs9 as a contribution to the
broader debate about the optimal general distribution of corporate power
between managers on the one hand and all shareholders as a group on the
other.10 The second explored a dozen corporate policies that attract QSs,
adding to the literature on how companies shape their shareholder base.11
The third elaborated a proposal for a separate precatory vote of QSs as a class
when boards propose actions otherwise requiring or warranting a general
shareholder vote, such as where by custom a vote of the minority
shareholders is held.12 While these publications were being produced, QSI’s
research continued to search for factors that attract or repel shareholders to
particular companies.
Ongoing empirical research generally involves comparing the QSI
ranking of companies by QS density with various rankings of companies and
their policies. For instance, QSI has considered correlations between QS
density and corporate statements of purpose, capital allocation prowess,
reputation for trustworthiness, board structure and diversity, shareholder
voting rights, corporate culture, and brand strength.13 The data tend to
challenge conventional wisdom on many practices, suggesting that the views
of QSs differ from those held by many in the governance establishment.
All of this research showcased by the QSI is propitious as new
research casts doubt on the reliability of databases long-used to debate
corporate governance.14 For at least two decades, such debates have been
shaped by a body of empirical work led by that of finance professors
Gompers, Ishi and Metrick.15 Using data created by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC, now part of Institutional Shareholder
Services or ISS), they found that investors generally fare far better investing
8

LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS: HOW THE BEST MANAGERS
ATTRACT AND KEEP THEM (2020).
9 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, 46 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (2020).
10 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010);
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L. J.
1554 (2015).
11 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cultivating Quality: Time to Revise and Update the
Shareholder Cultivation Literature, 15 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 85 (2021).
12 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Ask the Smart Money: Shareholder Votes by a "Majority of
the Quality Shareholders", 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 1 (2021).
13 See infra Part III.
14 Jens Frankenreiter, et al., Cleaning Corporate Governance, (U. Pa. L. Rev., Working
Paper No. 738/2021) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796628.
15 Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107,
125-29 (2003).
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in “democratic” than “despotic” companies. Dubbed the G-Index,
researchers proliferated numerous variations using similar datasets.16
Influential advisors to large institutional investors, such as ISS and MSCI,
commercialized recommendations based on such data.
But according to a major study by law professors Jens Frankenreiter,
Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, and Eric Talley, this research contains many
errors.17 Coders misinterpreted source material on some basic features, such
as whether a company had dual class shares, a staggered board, or
supermajority voting.18 Among dramatic effects of correcting for these errors
erases, most of any return premium to democratic compared to despotic
companies.19
The new study and database promise better understanding for
investors on key topics in corporate governance. There are many hypotheses
to be tested, including those surfaced by the QSI. For example, the QSI data
suggests governance provisions operate differently in varying contexts, so
that what’s good for one company is bad for another. It also suggests that
many factors well beyond those treated as central in recent decades matter
more. If the Frankenreiter study creates a fresh slate for corporate
governance debates, then the QSI research offers a timely contribution to the
new direction of this research.
In this Article, we summarize some aspects of the previously
reported research and collate the many hypotheses and correlation test results
applied since the most recent publications. This draws together parts of the
book, research articles and columns.
Part I reviews the literature on segmenting a shareholder base, along
with observations on debate over whether any of various active investment
strategies, such as those embedded in QSI, are capable of outperforming
passive indexing on a systemic basis. Part II reports on the many different
research methods that can be used to identify QSs and the companies that
attract them. Dozens of techniques are presented, culled from both existing
secondary sources as well as original QSI data crunching. Notably, the multipronged effort tends to converge in identifying the same investors and
companies across different sources and measures. Part III, the heart of the
Article, presents a series of tests for the correlation between a variety of
corporate practices and the attraction of QSs. This contributes a fresh view
on many overlooked or underappreciated topics.
I.

THE QUALITY SHAREHOLDER SEGMENT

As background, this Part offers a definition of quality shareholders
and identifies contrasting cohorts. It then briskly reviews some features of
16

See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 132-135 (2016).
17 See Frankenreiter, et al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 3).
18 Id. (manuscript at 33).
19 Id. (manuscript at 39).
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the QS cohort along with highlights of ongoing debate in the financial
community about whether such a strategy can be viable in terms of
shareholder returns. Such preliminary framing will set the stage for Part II’s
reports on methods of identifying QS and Part III’s engagement with what
they prioritize.
A. Shareholder Quadrants
This research first delineates multiple shareholder types based on
both horizon and conviction. To visualize this, shareholder cohorts can be
identified using a 2 x 2 diagram arraying investment conviction across the
top and investment horizon down the side. The result reveals combinations
of conviction and horizon, as shown in Table I.1.

INVESTMENT CONVICTION

Lower

Higher

Shorter

Transients

Activists

Longer

Indexers

Quality

INVESTMENT
HORIZON

Table I.1: The 2 x 2 Diagram
To animate the approach, descriptive names are assigned: transients
to shorter-term/diversifiers; indexers to longer-term diversifiers; activists to
shorter-term concentrators; and quality to longer-term concentrators.
Investment conviction is measured by the degree of an investor’s portfolio
diversification versus concentration, with lower conviction meaning the
most diversified portfolio—epitomized by index funds. Investment horizon
is measured by the investor’s average holding period in its investments.
Delineating the different criteria enables consideration of the tradeoffs. That will help managers attract shareholders they desire and
policymakers tailor public policy, in each case ideally towards long-term and
informed investors.
The stakes are high, as these debates touch fundamental issues in
corporate governance. The rise of institutional investors raised the volume
of shareholder voices on a wide range of matters, from director elections to
say on executive pay and influence on corporate proposals spanning from
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climate change and gender diversity to strategic direction and corporate
priorities.20
B. QS Performance
This Article does not investigate or make claims concerning
investment strategy or portfolio construction, nor contend that QSs
systemically achieve superior investment results. Accordingly, no data have
been sought or presented that would support such assertions. However, such
topics are inevitably raised when considering the QS approach of patient
focus, compared to short-term trading, a pure index, or any other of
innumerable investing styles. Some brief probing of the topic has therefore
been done and reported.
At the most general level, ongoing debate in the literature and
practice on investing rages around whether stock indexing or stock picking
is a superior strategy, often delineating further into types of broad indexes
(by size, sector, or geography) with stock pickers competing against that
benchmark.21 A foundational contribution to that debate is a 1997 article by
Mark Carhart, then a professor of finance at the University of Southern
California, finding no evidence of successful mutual fund stock pickers.22
Ensuing research contributed to what became conventional wisdom,
such as: average active funds underperform the market after fees;23 top fund
performance doesn’t persist;24 and, while some managers are skilled, few
deliver on that value for customers after fees.25 Yet debate continues—and
See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Georgia State
University Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk Workshop: Institutional Investors:
Power and Responsibility (April 19, 2013) (finding that institutional investors have a voice
when it comes to “the quality and diversity of Boards of Directors, as well as compensation
structures and concerns about the runaway growth in executive pay”); Morgan LaManna &
Rob Berridge, Acting on the Climate Crisis, 8 PROXY MONTHLY 8, 8 (2021),
https://www.proxyinsight.com/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2021/08/Proxy-MonthlyJuly-2021.pdf (“[i]n this record-setting proxy season, investors won majority votes on 14
climate-related shareholder proposals in both the U.S. and Canada, more than double last
year’s winning votes.”); Lyuba Golster et al., Heads-Up for the 2021 Proxy Season: Focus
on Diversity Disclosure, WEIL GOVERNANCE AND SECURITIES WATCH (March 22, 2021),
https://governance.weil.com/proxy-season-updates/heads-up-for-the-2021-proxy-seasonfocus-on-diversity-disclosure/ (“For the 2021 proxy season thus far, shareholder proponents
have submitted more than 60 proposals on diversity, racial justice and human capital issues
more broadly, including proposals asking companies to prepare a diversity and inclusion
report.”).
21 See Martijn Cremers, Jon Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the Conventional
Wisdom on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on
Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 75 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 8, 21 (2019).
22 Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 57 (1997)
(finding that the empirical evidence did “not support the existence of skilled or informed
mutual fund portfolio managers”); see also Michael Jensen, The Performance of Mutual
Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. FIN. 389, 415 (1968).
23 William Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, 47 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 7, 7 (1991).
24 See Carhart, supra note 22, at 72.
25 Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund
Performance, 65 J. FIN. 1915, 1916 (2010).
20
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Buffett won a famous bet siding with indexers over hedge funds—at least
those charging particularly high fees.26 Multiple editions of best-selling
books continue to showcase dueling philosophies in academia: University of
Pennsylvania finance professor Jeremy Siegel has repeatedly shown that
buy-and-hold works,27 while Princeton University finance professor Burton
Malkiel continues to release new editions of the book that legitimized
indexing as a strategy.28
But changes in shareholder demographics during the past two
decades, combined with increased competition and lower fees, produced a
new strand of research challenging these conventional views. For instance,
there is evidence that the average active fund does outperform an equivalent
index;29 some top-performance records do persist;30 and a sizable cohort of
managers with particular traits demonstrate skill that covers their fees.31 As
University of Notre Dame finance professor Martijn Cremers suggests in his
comprehensive review of contemporary research, among those traits are
conviction and patience.32 Those are the defining traits of QSs.
Concerning particular investor performance, many different ratings
exist such as Morningstar, Lipper, Zacks, TheStreet.com and Standard &
Poor’s.33 These organizations segment investors into numerous categories
26

In 2008, Buffett bet a hedge fund manager the S&P 500 would, over the ensuing ten
years, outperform, after fees, any hedge fund portfolio the manager cared to assemble. See
BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, at 180-183. The manager assembled a fund of
funds, a configuration charging multiple layers of high fees. During the first three years, the
S&P lagged the fund, but by bet’s end, the S&P won. If many took from the bet the lesson
that indexers are always superior to non-indexed investing, that is a mistake. The primary
point was to stress that ordinary individuals are almost certainly better off, given the risks
and fees, of staking their savings in index funds rather than entrusting it to high-cost hedge
funds.
27 See JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 220 (5th ed. 2014); see also LOUIS
ENGEL & HENRY R. HECHT, HOW TO BUY STOCKS 125 (8th ed. 1994).
28 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 257 (12th ed. 2019).
29 Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund
Industry, 118 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 17 (2015); Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen,
Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 147, 162–64 (2017); Hyunglae Jeon,
Jangkoo Kang & Changjun Lee, Precision About Manager Skill, Mutual Fund Flows, and
Performance Persistence, 40 N. AM. J. ECON. FIN. 222, 236 (2017).
30 See Nicolas Bollen & Jeffrey Busse, Short-term Persistence in Mutual Fund
Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 571 (2004); Robert Kosowski, Allan Timmermann,
Russ Wermers & Hal White, Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence
from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2593 (2006).
31 Yakov Amihud & Ruslan Goyenko, Mutual Fund’s R2 as Predictor of Performance, 26
REV. FIN. STUD. 667, 680 (2013); Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your
Fund Manager? A New Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329, 3332
(2009).
32 Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill
of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 289 (2016).
33
See e.g., Ratings, S&P GLOBAL,
https://disclosure.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/ratings-actions (last visited Sept. 11,
2021); Best Investments, MORNINGSTAR, https://www.morningstar.com/best-investments

8

THE BUSINESS & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1]

and subcategories such as sector (energy, technology etc.), style (value or
growth), size (large, mid-cap, small), or time (a spectrum from one to 20
years).34 Such lists include frequent references to many QSs identified as
such in Part II, including such household names as Capital Group, Fidelity,
Franklin Templeton, and T. Rowe Price.35
C. QS Attractor Performance
It also appears to be the case that the companies in which QSs invest
the most tend to outperform as well. For instance, QSI’s database ranks a
large sample (n=2070) of large companies according to their propensity to
attract a high density of QS. First, we constructed a hypothetical portfolio of
the QSDR top 20, equally weighted, and assumed invested from January
2014 through July 2021. That portfolio, whose names appear in Table I.1,
generated a 17.27% (CAGR, with dividends reinvested) compared to
14.18% for the Vanguard 500 Index Investor.
Roper Technologies, Inc.
Selective Insurance Group, Inc.
AptarGroup, Inc.
Amphenol Corporation
Dolby Laboratories
Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc.
BlackRock, Inc.
West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc.
Stryker Corporation
Public Storage

AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
Cincinnati Financial Corporation
General Dynamics Corporation
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Balchem Corporation
Gartner, Inc.
Jack Henry & Associates, Inc.
News Corporation
Digital Realty Trust, Inc.
Sensient Technologies
Corporation
Table I.2: The QSI-20

Second, we compared two portfolios over the QSDR study period
(2014-2018): one comprised of the 25 companies attracting the highest
density of QSs and the other of the 25 attracting the lowest density of QS.
The high QS density portfolio outperformed the low QS density portfolio in
each of those five years.36

visited Sept 11, 2021); Zacks Rank, ZACKS https://www.zacks.com/stocks/zacks-rank (last
visited Sept. 11, 2021); Lippers Leaders, LIPPERS
http://www.lipperleaders.com/QuickInfo.aspx?pid=Investors (last visited Sept 11, 2021);
Top Rated, THESTREETS, https://www.thestreet.com/topics/mutual-funds/top-rated-mutualfunds (last visited Sept. 11, 2021).
34 See, e.g., Sector/Industry Research, S&P GLOBAL (last visited Sept. 11, 2021),
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/sector/corporates/corporate-sector.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
36 Performance is measured as the cumulative return, or total change in the price of the
investment expressed as a percentage, on daily unadjusted historical closing prices from the
first trading day in 2014 through the last trading day of 2018.
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Portfolio Performance of Top 25 and Bottom 25
(1/2/2014 - 12/31/2018)
250%
200%
150%
100%
50%
0%
1/2/2014

1/2/2015

1/2/2016
TOP25

1/2/2017

1/2/2018

BOTTOM25

Third, we compared the relative performance of the top 69 in QS
density on that list. Those with higher QS density tend to outperform those
with lower, true even for longer periods. Consider the performance
distribution of QS attractors over the 10-year period from 2010 through mid2020. For comparison, during that period, the cumulative return of the S&P
500 was 181.9% and of the Russell 3000 180.73%.
In the following chart, such performance places both indices in the
100–200% performance band (red bar). Of the top 69 QS attractors, sixty
percent (41) outperformed while forty percent (28) underperformed. A
hypothetical portfolio only with the top 69 QS attractors, each company
given equal weights, outperformed the S&P 500 by approximately 200%.
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Hypothetical Portfolio Performance of QS Attractors
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Cumulative Return

500%
400%
300%

S&P 500 Index
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1/4/2010

0%

We recognize that this is an extremely limited sample and aim to
conduct further testing. Meanwhile, however, the results accord with
anecdotal evidence and can be explained on rational grounds.37 So why
might companies with higher densities of QSs perform better than rivals with
lower-quality shareholder bases? Superior economics and related
performance would certainly attract such shareholders, so that high QS
density is a consequence rather than a cause of such a correlation.
But it also seems plausible that the existence of a high density of
QSs confers a variety of competitive advantages on corporations that help
explain such superiority. For instance, QSs give managers longer time
horizons to execute on strategy than transients; cast more informed
shareholder votes than indexers that may add value; and pursue engagement
with managers that is more productive and patient than activists, including
providing a brain trust to draw upon for board service and consultation.38
II.

IDENTIFYING QSS AND THEIR ATTRACTORS

In order to segment shareholders into these cohorts, it is necessary
to apply both quantitative and qualitative analysis. While elements of
judgment and assumptions are required, they are supported by the data. We

37

See Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment
Skill of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. OF FIN. ECON. 290, 304
(2016) (providing anecdotal information about investors who would qualify as QSs, and the
comparative success of their investment strategies).
38 See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 25-27, 35, &42.
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are reminded of the quip of noted quality management expert, W. Edwards
Deming: “Without data, you are just another person with an opinion.”39
The adage attributed to John Maynard Keynes is also apt: “it is better
to be approximately right than precisely wrong.”40 This wisdom applies to
any attempt to identify the QSs from among today’s vast universe of
institutional investors. Reliable selections depend on both objective criteria
and subjective calls. The following is a summary of the approaches used in
this research.
The primary selection criteria for this research are as follows: (1)
QSs are shareholders that historically, over a multi-year period, have
exhibited a consistent behavior of investing in high concentrations and for
long holding periods; and (2) companies whose shareholder base is
comprised of a high relative density of such shareholders.
Creating criteria to quantify shareholder cohorts raises challenges,
like between what’s short- and long-term and what’s a diversified versus
concentrated portfolio. While there are QSs under the tightest definitions of
long-term and concentrated—say average holding periods of 8 years and no
more than 20 stocks—today’s investment universe is so prone to both trading
and indexing that the pool tails off quickly. To some, plausible criteria for
quality might be as little as a 2-year holding period and 200 or fewer stocks.
Some large financial institutions might be classified in one category
but have multiple funds within them better classified in another. For
example, Neuberger Berman as a firm in aggregate shows an index level of
diversification yet offers many investors a selection of funds with managers
who certainly count as QSs.41 Each fund within a family may warrant
separate evaluation.
Also warranting separate evaluation are shareholders not required to
publicly disclose their positions, unlike large institutions. These are
individuals or small firms who shun the ubiquitous mutual funds in favor of
selecting their own portfolio. They are clearly not indexers, though the exact
distribution as transient versus QSs is hard to determine and may vary with
different companies. One thing is clear: despite the rise of institutional equity
39

Milo Jones & Phillipe Silzerbahn, A Brave New World of Data, FORBES (Sept 18, 2021
6:04 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/silberzahnjones/2016/03/15/without-an-opinionyoure-just-another-person-with-data/?sh=41c0bd8699fc.
40 See Hans Nilsson, It is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong, European Council
for an Energy Efficient Economy, https://www.eceee.org/all-news/columns/it-is-better-tobe-roughly-right-than-precisely-wrong/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2021).
41

Neuberger Berman Small Cap Growth Fund, NEUBERGER BERMAN,
https://www.nb.com/en/us/products/mutual-funds/small-cap-growth-fund?nbmi=0954 (last
visited Sept. 19, 2021) (showing a fund with high percentage of portfolio turnover);
Neuberger Berman Intrinsic Value Fund, NEUBERGER BERMAN,
https://www.nb.com/en/us/products/mutual-funds/intrinsic-value-fund?nbmi=1075 (last
visited Sept. 19, 2021) (showing a fund with a lower-than-average percentage of portfolio
turnover).
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ownership in recent decades, individuals and families still own one-third of
corporate equity—a formidable cohort.
Some shareholders are QSs to one company while being another’s
indexer or transient: some shareholders may have a huge stake in one favored
company held forever while the rest of the portfolio is either indexed or
traded rapidly. For instance, First Manhattan is undoubtedly a QS of
Berkshire Hathaway (at least 25% of its recent portfolio, since 1966) but not,
say, a QS of Hostess Brands (it recently bought and sold a small stake within
3 quarters).42 Likewise, even Numeric, an exquisite transient, has 2.5% of its
portfolio in Facebook held since its 2013 IPO.43
There are many ways to segment the shareholder universe to
distinguish quality shareholders from the rest. Detailed in what follows are a
dozen different techniques QSI has applied. Other databases and researchers
may apply different tests and, depending on whether the research is
proprietary or purely academic, may keep results confidential or publicize
them.
All provide reliable inputs and rankings of a large number of
institutional shareholders that file periodic portfolio reports with the SEC.
Each database differs slightly in the covered population, the criteria applied,
and the resulting classification scheme. This variety provides a menu for
interested constituents to choose from to meet varying objectives.
For an academic example, Professor Bushee’s academic database
classifies investors into dedicated, transient and quasi-indexer, based on the
combination of average holding periods and overall concentration level.44 In
effect, “dedicated” is the functional equivalent of QS. For a proprietary
example, EQX also maintains the EQX database ranking investors by
average relative holding periods and concentration levels, as well as the
companies that attract them in high density.45
Other databases may focus on one or the other but not both. An
example focused on concentration is the active share measure of Professors
Cremers and Pareek, focused exclusively on concentration.46 Measuring
42

First Manhattan Company Top 13F Holdings, WHALEWISDOM,
https://whalewisdom.com/filer/first-manhattan-co#tabholdings_tab_link (last visited Sept.
17, 2021); Hostess Brands Inc A Owner History, FORMTHIRTEEN,
https://formthirteen.com/securities/44109J106-hostess-brands-inc-a/history (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021).
43 Numeric Investors, Holdings Report (Form 13F) (Feb. 5, 2014); Man Group PLC,
Holdings Report (Form 13F) (Aug. 16, 2021); Acquisition of Numeric by Man Group, MAN
GROUP, https://www.man.com/acquisition-of-numeric (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) (showing
that Numeric’s holdings are filed under Man Group’s 13F after Man Group Acquired
Numeric in 2014).
44 Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the Behavior
of Institutional Investors, 16 J. APPLIED. CORP. FIN. 28, 29 (2004).
45 EQX, https://www.eqxse.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2021)
46 See Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment
Skill of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 291–
92 (2016).
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portfolio construction on a 0-1 scale from pure index to pure concentration,
active share has become a prominent metric to distinguish between purely
passive asset managers and true stock pickers.47
It’s helpful to use multiple research methods as no single metric can
incontestably identify the cohort of QSs, given the judgments necessary in
defining both duration and concentration as well as the varying sources
available to segment shareholders along these lines. Accordingly, the QSI
has employed many different methods—and continues to do so. The
following is a survey and summary. Despite the variety, however, or perhaps
due to it, there is remarkable overlap in the populations that the various
methods yield. Accordingly, taken together, there does seem to be a discrete
population of QSs that warrant study.
Surveys. One way to identify QSs, in general or at particular
companies, is to survey leading investors. A similar method for identifying
companies that succeed in attracting quality shareholders would survey
investor relations professionals with analogous knowledge. The latter is an
obvious winner for companies undertaking such an examination, whose inhouse staff is an excellent starting point.
The survey approach is endorsed in several prominent writings by
and about outstanding investors, heavily oriented toward QSs. Examples
include the celebrated 1984 Buffett article, The Superinvestors of Grahamand-Doddsville, and a 2005 sequel by Columbia University law professor
Louis Lowenstein—along with a comment on the latter by Seth Klarman of
Baupost Group, as well as numerous other books profiling outstanding
investors.48 Such research yields the exemplars shown in Table II.1.
Brave Warrior
Chieftain
Davis Selected Advisers
First Eagle
First Manhattan

Phil Fisher
Glenn Greenberg
Grinnell College
J. M. Keynes
Charles Munger
Thomas Rowe Price

Ruane Cunniff
Lou Simpson
Southeastern
Tweedy Browne
Ralph Wanger

Table II.1: QSs in Literature/Surveys
Berkshire Based. Given Warren Buffett’s successful 50-year effort
to attract QSs to Berkshire Hathaway, that company’s shareholder list is a
47

Id.; Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/07/active-share.asp
(last visited Sept. 17 2021).
48 See Warren Buffett, The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville, HERMES, May 1985,
at; Louis Lowenstein, Searching for Rational Investors in a Perfect Storm, 30 J. CORP. L.
539, 542–43 (2005); Seth A. Klarman, A Response to Lowenstein’s Searching for Rational
Investors in A Perfect Storm, 30 J. CORP. L. 561, 565 (2005); Bruce N. Greenwald, et al.,
VALUE INVESTING: FROM GRAHAM TO BUFFETT AND BEYOND 159, 211–24 (2001); see ALLEN
C. BENELLO, MICHAEL VAN BIEMA & TOBIAS E. CARLISLE, CONCENTRATED INVESTING:
STRATEGIES OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST CONCENTRATED VALUE INVESTORS 109–11 (2016);
JOHN TRAIN, MONEY MASTERS OF OUR TIME 306 (2000).

14

THE BUSINESS & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1]

good place to find QSs. Start with the most concentrated Berkshire
shareholders—there are at least 250 with more than 5% of their portfolio
staked in the company, almost all of which have held the stock for decades.49
To make the search manageable and meaningful, select an
appropriate sample or investment size, such as the 20 with the largest stakes
or all those whose stakes exceed $250 million. Examine their portfolios to
identify other companies they concentrate in for long periods.
Finally,
examine those companies to identify other concentrated long-term
shareholders. The result will be a credible group of both QSs and companies
who attract them.
Examples of concentrated and substantial long-term Berkshire
shareholders appear in Table II.2. Some other companies in which such
Berkshire shareholders hold substantial long-term stakes are presented in
Table II.3.
Akre Capital
Everett Harris
Lourd Capital
Arlington Value
First Manhattan
Markel
Check Capital
Gardner Russo
Mar Vista
Consulta
Giverny Capital
Ruane Cunniff
Cortland Advisers
Global Endowment
Wedgewood Partners
Davis Selected Advisers Greylin Investment
Weitz Investment
Douglass Winthrop
Kovitz
Eagle Capital
Lee Danner & Bass
Table II.2: QSs of Berkshire Hathaway
Abbott Labs
Credit Acceptance
Markel
Accenture
Danaher
Nestlé
Alphabet (Google)
Fairfax Financial
O’Reilly Automotive
Amazon
Johnson & Johnson
Unilever
CarMax
Liberty Media
Wells Fargo
Table II.3: Other Investees of Berkshire Hathaway QSs

Existing Empirical Research. An additional resource is published
empirical research. The methods can be adapted to suit particular companies,
by features such as size or industry. Such research rarely lists particular
shareholders by type, rather analyzing aggregate data to address broader
questions. But there are exceptions, such as a Table II.4 of both QSs and
transients in recent research about their different effects on given company

49

See Quality Shareholders Initiative, Quality Shareholder Density Ranking (on file with
the author and the QSI).
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risk profiles and market pricing.50 The following chart presents each type
alphabetically.
Among Top Quality
Among Top Transients
Berkshire Hathaway
AIM
Capital Research & Management
Investors Research
Jennison Associates
Janus
Fidelity Management & Research
Putnam
Harris Associates (Oakmark Funds)
Marsico
State Farm
Oppenheimer
Southeastern Asset Management
UBS Warburg
Wellington
Table II.4: QSs and Transients in Empirical Research
Cremers and Pareek created a 13F-based data set of all institutional
investors dating to 1980, presenting, quarter-by-quarter, each shareholder’s
concentration (measured as deviation from the index, with the index equal to
0.0) and average holding period.51 In this massive data base, the cutoff for
the top quintiles were 0.9 for concentration and 2.0 years for holding
periods.52
From the top quartile of both—excluding foundations and private
equity funds holding one or a few stocks—one doing this analysis should
choose a relevant time period, such as the most recent five-years, omit
duplicate names, and rank the remaining names by frequency of quarters
making the list. This process yielded a total of 195 names, a rich vein of QSs.
There was substantial overlap in this cohort with that identified using the
other methods. Selected additional names appear in Table II.5
(alphabetically):
Allen Holding
Bislett Mgmt.
Dane Falb Stone
D.F. Dent
Fenimore
50

First Pacific
Flood Gable
Kahn Brothers
Sleep, Zakaria
Southeastern

Timucuan
W. H. Reaves
Wallace Capital
Water Street
Westport

See Paul Borochin & Jie Yang, The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm
Valuation and Governance, J. FIN. ECON. 171, 175 (2017). The table highlighted the various
QSs by portfolio size.
51 Cremers & Pareek, supra note 37, at 289.
52 Id. at 290. The median concentration level is 79%, with the authors classifying those
below 60% as closet indexers. The median holding period is 1.166 years (14 months), with
the bottom quintile breakpoint being .483 (7 months). Holding periods have been fairly
stable over time, though increasing in recent years. Those with concentration scores above
.96 are usually associated with special purposes, such as foundations whose portfolios are
dominated by a single stock (Hershey Trust, Hewlett Foundation, Lilly Endowment);
companies with large permanent stakes in publicly traded subsidiaries (Loews Corporation,
Moody National Bank); and private equity firms with such transitional stakes (Apollo, Ares,
Bain Capital, Thomas H. Lee Partners, General Atlantic, Pacific Financial).
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Fiduciary Mgmt.
Speece, Thorson
Wintergreen Advisers
Table II.5: QSs Derived from Cremers-Pareek Data

Resources. Several website services provide useful data. Rocket
Financial digests quarterly updated 13F filings.53 The site presents
shareholder lists and investor portfolios in columns of data that can be sorted
in a variety of ways and/or downloaded to spreadsheets for further
manipulation, including calculating concentration. The site tabulates
quarterly filings over time to enable calculating holding periods as well.54
The FloatSpec website was made available to Initiative researchers
during its incubation and before its developers sold it to PJT Partners. Upon
entering company or fund names, the site presents brief profiles along with
rankings, such as fund turnover and certain categories of shareholder type.55
One extract ranked shareholders by a combination of their quartile rankings
in terms of turnover and concentration. There was substantial overlap in this
cohort with that identified using both the Berkshire method and the
previously discussed method. Selected additional names appear in Table II.6
(alphabetically):
Aristotle
Burgundy
Lee, Danner & Bass
Atlanta
Douglass Winthrop
London Co. of VA
Barrow Hanley
Fairholme
Mar Vista
Beck, Mack & Oliver
Franklin Mutual
Sprucegrove
Broad Run
Greenbrier
Tweedy Browne
Brown Brothers
Jackson National
Harriman
Table II.6: QSs Derived from FloatSpec Data

IHS Markit maintains a rich database of shareholders and their
investees.56 It is broad in scope, scooping up not only 13F data but data from
multiple other reliable sources.57 Using the database, we selected for
investment managers with the lowest portfolio turnover as classified by the
site and a concentration by ownership of 100 or fewer names. That resulted
in a total of just 65 accounts, with the following 15 investing at least $1
billion in equities.
Alpine
53

Focused Investors

Marshfield Associates

Rocket Financial News and Filings 13F, ROCKET FINANCIAL,
http://www.rocketfinancial.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2021).
54 Id.
55 See Christopher Friend & Peter Heye, Do you know your Investors?, MEDIUM (Jan. 8,
2018), https://medium.com/fintech-sandbox-the-weekly/do-you-know-your-investorsee08bbc8740f.
56 See Institutional ownership data: Quantitative research results, HIS MARKIT 1, 1 (Jun.
23, 2021), https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/institutional-ownership-data-quantitativeresearch-results.html.
57 See id.
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Cacti
FPR Partners
McDonald Capital
Cantillon
Gardner Russo & Gardner
Saratoga Research
Check Capital
Gillespie Robinson & Grim Schwerin Boyle
Compass Capital Loews Corp.
Standard General
Table II.7A: QSs Derived from IHS Data

Trading Data. To proxy companies boasting patient shareholders,
consider data relating either share trading volume to shares outstanding or
dollar trading volume to market capitalization. We did the latter using S&P
Capital IQ data.58 We ran it for both smaller groups such as the S&P 500,
larger groupings such as the Russell 3000, and even larger universes
encompassing substantially all publicly traded companies. We examined
results on different timelines, one, three, and five years.
These are the 40 or so companies from the S&P 500 with the lowest
share turnover for the one-year period ending with the third quarter of 2018.
These appear in Table II.7 (in order down the columns then across the rows).
Berkshire Hathaway
Charles Schwab
Rollins
Alphabet (Google)
Stryker
Fortive
BlackRock
Northrop Grumman
Accenture
Johnson & Johnson
Wells Fargo
Ecolab
The Coca-Cola Co.
American Express
General Dynamics
Walmart
Union Pacific
Marsh & McLennan
Eli Lilly
Exxon Mobil
PPG Industries
Pfizer
3M Company
Lockheed Martin
Abbott Labs
Roper Technologies
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Visa
Oracle Corporation
Microsoft
PNC Financial
JPMorgan Chase
Cisco Systems
Air Products
PepsiCo
Danaher
Procter & Gamble
UnitedHealth
Intuit Inc.
Table II.7: QSs Derived from Trading Data (S&P 500)

From among the Russell 3000,59 Table II.8 presents selected names appeared
in the top quintile (in order, down the columns and across the rows):
Seaboard Corporation
VICI Properties
Erie Indemnity
Brookfield Property

58

Enstar
Fairfax Financial
Markel
Constellation
Software

Graham Holdings
Liberty Global
Alleghany
Cimpress

See Ownership, S&P GLOBAL,
https://www.marketplace.spglobal.com/en/datasets/ownership-(20) (last visited Sep. 20,
2021).
59 See Membership list: Russell US Indexes, FTSE RUSSELL,
https://content.ftserussell.com/sites/default/files/ru3000_membershiplist_20210628.pdf (last
visited Sep. 21, 2020).
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Table II.8: QSs Derived from Trading Data (Russell 3000)
Empirical Data Analytics. In empirical research of this Initiative, we
identified those institutional investors with the highest conviction in their
positions and greatest patience, using a multi-factor ranking model, and
identified some of the companies in which that cohort most often invested.
We examined the 20F filings of institutional investors registered/operating
in the U.S. and/or Canada which made quarterly reporting during all quarters
from 2014 to 2018, had a minimum $1.1B AUM, 60 and a majority of whose
investments were in corporate equity. We removed avowed indexers,
activists, and private equity.
Concerning conviction, the model analyzed such factors as: (1) the
percentage weight of a stock in the portfolio; (2) relative concentration levels
of the portfolio; (3) average voting power of the portfolio in the companies
of the stocks it holds; (4) number of stocks in the portfolio with significant
ownership (>0.1% of market cap); and (5) total number of stocks in the
portfolio. Relative patience was probed by such factors as: (1) the portfolio’s
gross traded dollar-value compared to its AUM and (2) the rate and
magnitude of change of a portfolio’s constituents, calculated by taking the
periodic standard deviation and overall standard deviation of stocks in a
portfolio.
The top 20 QSs are presented in Table II.9 (in order, down columns
and across rows):
Berkshire Hathaway
Gates Foundation
State Farm Auto Ins.
Baupost Group
Fiduciary Management
Southeastern

Blue Harbour
Lyrical
Baker Brothers
Viking Global
Temasek Holdings
Capital Research Global
Socpia Capital
Matrix Capital
Lone Pine Capital
Stockbridge Partners
Kensico Capital
Glenview Capital
Cantillon Capital
Irdian Asset Management
Table II.9: QSs Derived from QSI Empirical Analysis

Among portfolio positions representing at least 2% of each such
QS’s portfolio, 300 different stocks appeared. Of these, 20 appeared thrice
or more as listed below and 38 appeared twice. Table II.10 presents a
selection of those:

60

While AUM data were not explicitly given, we defined an equation to compute the
quarterly capital invested by each 13F filer. Using the manager’s identification number and
stock holdings information, we aggregated quarterly holdings (shares owned multiplied by
stock price) of each manager to compute quarterly AUM. To manage the data, at some cost
in size skewing, only managers with average annual AUM (sum of quarterly AUM in a
specific year divided by 4 quarters) exceeding $1 billion were retained.
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Twice (A Sampling)
Abbott Labs
Accenture
Autodesk
Berkshire Hathaway
DowDuPont
Ecolab
ExxonMobil
FedEx
Investors Bank
Liberty Media
United Technologies
Walmart

Thrice
Allergan
Anthem
Booking Holdings
Broadcom
Coca Cola
Constellation Brands
Ebay
Intel
Mastercard
Netflix
S&P Global
TransDigm
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Four Times
Alibaba
Thermo Fisher
United Health
Five Times
Amazon
Visa
Six Times
Facebook
Microsoft
Nine Times
Alphabet

Table II.10: Common Investees of QSs
We also ranked a large sampling (2,070) of companies based on the
extent to which their institutional investor base exhibits the traits of QSs, in
terms of time-horizon and concentration, called the QS Density Ranking
(QSDR). The QSDR is a proxy of the degree to which companies attract a
high density of QSs. It can be used to understand which corporate policies
and practices are associated with a high density of QS.
The QSDR can also be used to position companies boasting ownership by a
particular QS in the context of the broader QS cohort. For instance, consider
relating the foregoing list of companies in which the top 20 QSs tend to
invest to the QSDR. All eight held four or more times are in the top half of
the QSDR; among those held thrice nearly half (5/11) are in the top quarter
(Allergan is not in the QSDR); and 64% (7/11) are in the top quarter. In the
random sampling of those represented twice, 58% (7/12) are in the top
quarter while 75% (9/12) are in the top half. Such figures suggest that when
leading QSs invest significantly in a particular company, it is likely that a
larger cohort of QS accompanies them.
*****
We continue to add data points in our effort to identify QSs and the
companies that attract them. Results vary across databases and methods,
naturally, but there is remarkable overlap in most cases that yields a fairly
reliable picture of the shareholders that make up this cohort and the
companies they prefer. Appendix A presents an aggregation of some of the
leading names of QSs and their investees.
III.

POLICIES AND PRACTICES

QSI is investigating numerous strategies of shareholder engagement
that might attract QSs. Concerning specific corporate policies or practices,
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we related publicly available data on various company practices to the QS
density ranking of 2,070 companies based on their relative proportion of QSs
(the “QSDR”).
Specifically, focus is on the percentage of companies following (or
not following) a given practice that appear high (or low) in the QSDR. For
example, no association can be asserted if companies following (or not
following) a given practice are evenly or haphazardly distributed across the
2,070 companies in the QSDR; but if the practice group members skew
mostly towards the high (say half are in the top decile) or low end of the
pool, such an association can be asserted.
We have tested a dozen levers and report the results in what follows.
The levers are clustered logically around four major themes in contemporary
literature on corporate governance and related topics. These are corporate
purpose, corporate culture, corporate governance, corporate boards and
corporate reality.
Corporate purpose, a voguish topic in corporate law scholarship of
recent years, sparked by the Business Roundtable statement and the rise of
ESG—both of which are reassessed here in light of the views QSs.61 In
particular, QSs embrace both the BRT and ESG ideas, but largely because
they are conventional rather than accord with the more radical fanfare and
rhetoric that has blanketed popular discourse.
Corporate culture is also in fashion among corporate law scholars,
stoked by a rising preoccupation with compliance and regulatory oversight.62
QSs are generally less enthusiastic about this development, tending to
disfavor command and control cultures in favor of trust-based cultures
characterized by decentralization and autonomy. Lessons here counsel
against zealotry around compliance cultures, as trust trumps it.
Corporate governance remains topic after bursting onto the
corporate law professor agenda in the 1980s, and it continues to bend
towards rigid formulaic and universal mandates rather than flexible, tailored
firm-specific provisions for which corporate law became famous generations
ago.63 QSs favor the latter and for good reason: there has always been doubt
about whether “good governance” so defined translates into superior
corporate performance.64 Recent scholarship, moreover, challenges the
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Here’s evidence that putting customers and
employees first turn out to be profitable for a company’s stockholders too, MARKETWATCH
(Oct. 14, 2020, 8:12 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-evidence-that-puttingcustomers-and-employees-first-turns-out-to-be-profitable-for-a-companys-stockholders-too2020-10-14?mod=lawrence-a.-cunningham_seemore; see Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Opinion: These savvy investors were ESG-friendly long before it was fashionable,
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 5, 2021, 2:51 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/qualityshareholders-were-esg-friendly-long-before-it-was-fashionable11614800744?mod=lawrence-a.-cunningham.
62 See Bryce Tingle, What Do we Really Know About Corporate Governance? A Review of
the Empirical Research Since 2000, 59 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 292, 293 (2018).
63 See Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1863 (2008).
64 See Frankenreiter, et al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 55).
61
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empirical basis for the status quo’s preference for prescription. 65 The QSI
contributions may therefore be particularly fruitful in this area.
Within corporate governance, a sub-set of important topics focuses
on the board of directors, particularly their relative ownership and diversity.
QSs value all three, it turns out, though somewhat differently than many. For
instance, many call for directors to own a little bit of stock which is often
given to them as a grant or through an option.66 QSs prefer large ownership
stakes bought with the directors’ own cash.67 On diversity, it has become the
trend in recent years to push for racial and gender diversity on boards,
including through statutes in California and disclose-or-explain rules on
NASDAQ.68 QSs may or may not support such mandates, but there is
evidence that they have supported more substantial results through volition
rather than compulsion. 69
Finally, unlike the foregoing, are a collection of off the beaten path
points that QSs regard as central yet mainstream discussion has neglected or
muted. First up is capital allocation, competitive advantages, shareholder
communications, and long CEO tenures.
A. Corporate Purpose70
In 2019, the Business Roundtable, an elite lobbying group of U.S.
executives, adopted a statement of corporate purpose that some say puts the
interests of workers and communities above those of shareholders.71 In this
view, the Roundtable rejected shareholder-centered statements of corporate
purpose, such as that of economist Milton Friedman, who wrote in 1970 that

65

Id.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1073 (2014).
67 See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 56.
68 S.B. 826, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); NASDAQ, RULE 5606 (2021).
69 See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 137.
70 This section comes from Cunningham’s Quality Investing columns in MarketWatch of
October 14, 2020 and March 3, 2021. This section comes from Cunningham’s Quality
Investing columns in MarketWatch of October 14, 2020 and March 3, 2021. See generally
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: These Savvy Investors Were ESG-Friendly Long
Before It Was Fashionable, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 3, 2011, 2:45 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/quality-shareholders-were-esg-friendly-long-before-itwas-fashionable-11614800744 (providing background information on ESG and their
influence in attracting QSs); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: S&P 500 Corporate
Boards Lack Diversity, but These Top Companies Are Leading Change — and the Stock
Market Rewards Them, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2020, 9:38 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-500-corporate-boards-lack-diversity-but-these-topcompanies-are-leading-change-and-the-stock-market-rewards-them-2020-10-23 (providing
background information on QSs and how diversity affects and intersects with corporations).
71 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘an Economy
That Serves All Americans', BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/RJW6ZBHW].
66
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the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits for
shareholders.72
Heated debate has followed.73 Champions of corporate social
responsibility herald the Roundtable’s statement, while critics claim it would
impose public obligations on the private sector.74 Skeptics warn that having
business leaders answering to many different constituents will impair
corporate accountability.75
“Yet there is a good case that there is less at stake than meets the
eye”—and not because the exercise was for show, but because it states a
reliable formula for corporate success. 76 And there is evidence that QSs tend
to agree with the Business Roundtable’s statement.77
Debate arises from the order of priorities in the Roundtable’s
statement of corporate purpose: customers, employees, suppliers, and
communities all come before stockholders, who are at the end.78 But while
this may sound inverted, the truth is profits for shareholders are increased by

72

Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-- the Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-socialresponsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/5GYL-XA8L].
73 See generally Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The
Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363, 363-65 (2021) (providing an overview
of “a high-profile public debate [that] is taking place over one of the oldest questions in
corporate law, namely, ‘[f]or whom is the corporation managed?’”).
74 See, e.g., Margaret Blair, Two Years After the Business Roundtable Statement: Pointing in
the Right Direction, PROMARKET (Sept. 13, 2021),
https://promarket.org/2021/09/13/business-roundtable-statement-right-directioncorporations-behaving-badly/ (arguing the Business Roundtable statement was a baby step
in the right direction because it has shifted dialogue to take into account stakeholders instead
of just shareholders but that it has not yet realized its goal); Nir Kossovsky, Opinion:
Fulfilling the Promise of the Business Roundtable’s Statement on Corporate Purpose,
CORPORATE SECRETARY (Aug. 30, 2021),
https://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/boardroom/32698/opinion-fulfilling-promisebusiness-roundtable%E2%80%99s-statement-corporate (arguing that companies
overpromised in their adoptions of the Business Roundtable statement).
75 See, e.g., Adina Holzman & Lisa Silverman, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation:
733 Days Later, JD SUPRA (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/statementon-the-purpose-of-a-1577930/ (explaining the various stakeholders and their positions
relative to the BR statement); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need
for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by
the Delaware General Corporation Law, Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law and Econ. Rsch. Paper
No. 15-08, 6-7, 9 (2015).
76 Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Was the Business Roundtable Statement Mostly for
Show?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (August 19, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/18/was-the-business-roundtable-statement-mostlyfor-show-2-evidence-from-corporate-governance-guidelines/; Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Opinion: Here’s Evidence that Putting Customers and Employees First Turns Out to Be
Profitable for a Company’s Stockholders Too, MarketWatch (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:12 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-evidence-that-putting-customers-and-employeesfirst-turns-out-to-be-profitable-for-a-companys-stockholders-too-2020-10-14.
77 Cunningham, supra note 76.
78 Id.
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catering to customers, rewarding employees, partnering with suppliers, and
being good corporate citizens.79
Nor is the Roundtable’s statement novel.80 In fact, it is almost a
carbon-copy of the revered credo of Johnson & Johnson, in place since
1943.81 Throughout that time, J&J has taken this mission statement seriously,
if not flawlessly, tending to the interests of all constituents, and delivering
shareholder profits as a result.82
As for what shareholders might think, the companies signing the
Roundtable’s statement are strong attractors of QSs.83 The QSDR includes
most of the ~180 Roundtable statement’s signatories.84 Among those
signatories, the vast majority rank in the top half for QS density, and onefourth in the top decile.85 In other words, QSs are drawn disproportionately
to the companies whose CEOs signed the statement.86
Nor is the Business Roundtable statement novel or unique.87 For
many years, the Drucker Institute has advocated similar principles,
associated with its namesake, management professor Peter Drucker.88 These
are statistically rigorous measures of customer satisfaction, employee
engagement, innovation, social responsibility, and financial strength.89 The
Drucker Institute annually applies these principles to rank the companies in
the S&P 500.90 There is a strong association between companies ranked
highly by the Drucker Institute and QS density.91
Why might QSs agree with the Business Roundtable’s mission
statement and the Drucker Institute’s principles? For one, given the longterm horizons of QSs, as compared to the short-term view of transient
shareholders, what is good for a corporation’s employees, customers,
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suppliers, and communities tends to be particularly good for long-term, highquality shareholders.92
Second, given the focused investment approach of QSs, as compared
to the all-market gauge of indexers, flexibility is essential, and the
Roundtable’s statement and Drucker principles are appealingly flexible.
They let individual companies express their mission their own way and are
general enough that directors can meet their legal duties that, unchanged,
require promoting the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
Toward one end of the spectrum, consider the philosophy of
signatory Stanley Bergman, Chairman and CEO of Henry Schein, a company
that tops the charts for QS density and has outperformed for shareholders
regularly since going public in 1995.93
In a 2015 interview, Bergman put forth this view of corporate
constituents:
“For the suppliers, the customers and the [employee] teams to work
together, you need capital, because it’s a business. We are very clear with
Wall Street: Henry Schein does not exist for the investors. Having said that,
we promise the investors a good rate of return and we deliver on those
expectations.”94
Toward the other end is the philosophy of an American business
legend, the late Roberto Goizueta, who headed The Coca-Cola Company
from 1981-1997.95 He often stated his view of corporate purpose as “the
maximization of shareholder value.”96 On Goizueta’s watch, Coca-Cola was
regularly ranked by Fortune Magazine among America’s most-admired
companies.97 It delivered outsized shareholder returns by nurturing a
business that catered to customers’ tastes, developed employees, and
protected communities.98 The company was also deft at attracting QSs, most
famously Warren Buffett.99
Buffett exemplifies the middle ground. He is well-known for
investing in companies that are “owner-oriented,” and takes that approach as
CEO of Berkshire Hathaway.100 Yet he recognizes the need for balancing the
interests of shareowners with employees and other constituents. Consider
Buffett’s 1985 discussion of a wrenching decision to close an ailing textile
mill:
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I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability
merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of
return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an
exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once
it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith
would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx
would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the
only position that leaves me comfortable.101
That comfortable middle ground is often reflected in the mission
statements of many companies that top lists of both QS density and
profitability.102 When companies focus on their constituents in these ways,
shareholder profits should follow. QSs should be attracted, creating a
virtuous circle that may explain the association between high QS density and
superior corporate performance. While it may seem that the Business
Roundtable now repudiates Milton Friedman’s views, QSs signal that there
is far greater overlap than the heated debate suggests.
The same is true when it comes to ESG, fashionable principles
addressing matters of environmental, social, and governance significance.103
QSs have been prospering by using such principles for decades, long before
the United Nations popularized them in 2005.104 The QSI compared two
recent ESG rankings, by Barron’s105 and Investors’ Business Daily,106 with
the QSDR.
The ESG and QS data correlate: the vast majority (80% or more) of
high-ranking ESG companies also rank in the top half for QS density. 107
Topping the Barron’s/IBD lists of ESG companies that also rank high for QS
are newer and older companies alike: younger companies such as Nvidia
(1993) and Salesforce (1999), and venerable titans such as Colgate101
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Palmolive (1806), Procter & Gamble (1837), Kimberly Clark (1872),
Kellogg (1906), Clorox (1913), Best Buy (1966), and Texas Instruments
(1951).108
History suggests that QSs are attracted to ESG principles because
both reflect long-term company-specific thinking.109 Unlike past social
movements, moreover, ESG keeps shareholder interests at the core of
corporate mission, as documented in important research by Professors Lund
and Pollman.110
To put ESG in historical context, consider the debates over corporate
purpose in the 1930s, following the Great Depression. One side, led by
Columbia University law professor Adolf Berle, argued that corporate
directors must be accountable to shareholders;111 the other, led by Harvard
University law professor Merrick Dodd, urged a corporate pursuit of social
objectives.112
Both views went mainstream, as companies focused on shareholder
profits while making substantial charitable donations. The accommodation
remained uneasy, however, as some reformers, such as economist Howard
Bowen, advocated greater corporate “social responsibility.”113
In the 1970s, debate reignited on corporate purpose. Economists,
echoing Berle, favored shareholder primacy while critics, led by Ralph
Nader, urged taming corporations to respond to public needs.114 The
Naderites won many legislative milestones during the 1970s, from protecting
consumers to the environment.115 But their assaults on corporate America
went too far, it turned out, and an era focused solely on “shareholder value”
followed.116
In the takeover fights of the 1980s, insurgents stressed “shareholder
value,” while embattled directors lobbied to consider “other constituencies,”
especially employees and communities.117 Yet by urging prioritizing such
constituents, advocates again overplayed their hand: in the end, directors
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could legally incorporate interests of other constituencies but only if those
rationally related to shareholder interests, which held priority.118
From the 1990s, critics again assailed shareholder primacy as
irresponsible.119 Despite gaining some prominence, this movement likewise
overshot its mark by advocating diverting corporate assets from shareholders
to others.120
Still, these movements planted important seeds. For one, they
revealed excesses of the status quo. As indicated in a 1987 Congressional
report, obsession with stock prices arose, and with it pressure to put shortterm results over long-term gains.121 Boards started paying executives in
corporate equity, riveting attention on stock price.122 Managers now
publicized quarterly forecasts and hosted quarterly calls for investment
analysts, stoking short-term pressure.123
Researchers in the early 2000s, meanwhile, began finding
correlations between certain practices deemed “socially responsible” and
corporate financial performance, in categories from employee relations and
pollution control to product quality and community involvement.124
These dynamics set the stage in 2005 for the United Nations to issue
its ESG principles.125 The U.N. said that “integrating ESG factors into
corporate and investor decisionmaking was critical for the security of
investments, prosperity, and growing markets.”126 It unveiled its “Principles
for Responsible Investment” at the New York Stock Exchange, citadel of
shareholder primacy. 127
Unlike their predecessors, these ESG principles stress factors that
enhance long-term shareholder value, an approach that concurs with history,
law, and practicalities.128 As a result, ESG went mainstream.129
From the 1980s to the early 2000s, socially responsible companies,
such as Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream (founded in 1978) or The Body Shop
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(1976), stood out as unusual.130 Today, companies that fail to acknowledge
ESG are outliers.131 QSs favor ESG’s emphasis on businesses and strategies
that are “sustainable,” a fashionable word that QSs have been using for
decades.132 While radical adaptations of ESG principles are destined to
follow history into failure, it is likely to endure if proponents keep the
movement mainstream.133 Similarly, despite prevailing cultures of control in
corporate life, people may actually do better when they are trusted rather
than controlled.
B. Corporate Culture and Trust134
For decades, American corporate culture has moved in the direction
of command and control.135 Boards faced rising pressure for accountability,
leading them to command corporate officers to install elaborate internal
controls, information systems and compliance programs.136 While wellintentioned, such efforts dampen the bonds of trust employees up and down
the ranks need to have.137
Over the same period, corporate governance moved toward
prescribed mandates for all companies.138 Today all boards are expected to
follow delineated protocols ordained “best practices,” whether or not they
are best for a particular company.139 Such uniformity diminishes the trust
130
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that can form when directors and shareholders exchange views and make
their own decisions based on the needs of the company.140
Countering this trend of control is a trust-based culture.141 A trustbased corporate culture relies on the assumption that businesses should be
decentralized into the smallest possible units whose performance can
usefully be measured to identify problems and opportunities.142 Hallmarks
of a trust-based corporate culture therefore include autonomy and
decentralization.143
Trust is a powerful motivator.144 Autonomy empowers employees to
focus on tasks rather than on reporting compliance. Payoffs include more
effective leadership, lower cost of administration, and other corporate
efficiencies.
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway exemplifies this approach.145
It takes a famously hands-off approach to management, delegating all
responsibility to the heads of its subsidiaries.146 The trust-based approach
works because the most important quality Berkshire looks for in new
managers and companies is trust—they pass up opportunities if they have a
shred of doubt about trustworthiness.147
Accountability follows. Based on interviews of scores of Berkshire
executives over the years, the consensus view was summed up in a pithy
comment by Jim Weber, head of Brooks Running Company where he said
he had never been given so much autonomy in his business career and had
never felt so accountable and responsible.148
The tone of trust is set at the top and percolates throughout the
organization in daily decisions, challenges, and crises, and the result
constitutes the company’s culture.149 Trust-based corporate cultures may be
characterized as learning organizations where employees enjoy considerable
autonomy and where small groups are allowed to experiment and then share
knowledge across the company.
Such hallmarks continue to characterize a wide range of businesses
today, especially insurance companies as well as diversified industrials.
Insurance is a trust-based business, after all, where the product is the promise
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to pay money and its value is almost entirely in being trusted to pay.150 In the
broader market, exemplars of trust-based cultures vary but tend to be united
by core practices such as autonomy and decentralization.151
The Trust Across America (TAA) initiative has identified the most
trustworthy U.S. public companies using objective and quantitative
indicators including accounting conservativeness and financial stability, as
well as a secondary screen of more subjective criteria such as employee
reviews and news reports.152 Companies regarded as trustworthy also tend to
rate highly in rankings of shareholder quality produced by the QSI, as well
as the proprietary database of EQX, which we use to cross-check QSI data.153
TAA’s assessment of the S&P 500 SPX, +0.75% in 2020 identified 51
companies, of which 49 are also included in the QSI rankings. Comparing
the two, more than one-fourth of the top TAA companies are in the top decile
of the QSI; two-thirds are in the top quarter, and all but two (92%) are in the
top half.154 Notably, both the TAA top 10 and the QSI Top 25 outperformed
the S&P 500 by 30% and 50%, respectively, in recent five-year periods.155
While some investors focus solely on the bottom line and others only
on signals of corporate virtue, QSs are holistic, considering the inherent
relationship between trust and long-term value.156 Nebulous as the notion of
trust in corporate culture might seem, it’s a profitable as well as ethical value
to probe.157 In the same spirit, contemporary commentary and policy has
promoted uniformity in governance through rigid specification of practices.
The QS research suggests that greater flexibility would be better, as
discussed next.
C. Governance Flexibility or Rigidity158
150
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Conventional wisdom is that a litany of governance practices, called
good, correlate with superior corporate performance. But the QSI has found
reasons to quarrel with this conventional wisdom in several contexts and
more recent scholarship has undermined much of the edifice supporting the
conventional views.
Empirical research on corporate governance dates back about two
decades to pioneering work by finance professors Gompers, Ishi, and
Metrick.159 Using data created by the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC, now part of Institutional Shareholder Services or ISS), an
entire generation of researchers became convinced that there’s a difference
between “good corporate governance” and “bad corporate governance.”160
Good governance increases “democratic” shareholder rights, like oneshare/one-vote, and bad governance increases “despotic” managerial power,
like a CEO also chairing the board. Good governance reaps better returns
for shareholders than bad governance, conventional wisdom and much
scholarship held.161
But according to the new study by law professors Jens Frankenreiter,
Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili and Eric Talley (FHNT), this research contains
many errors.162 Coders misinterpreted source material on some basic
features163, such as whether a company had dual class shares, a staggered
board or supermajority voting. In a multi-year effort, these scholars have
built an entirely new dataset they hand-coded from the governance
provisions of nearly 3,000 public company charters.164 Comparing their
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findings with the original IRRC data and its offspring, FHNT report
“alarming” errors in the original coding.165 Aggregate effects are dramatic,
such as erasing most of any return premium to democratic compared to
despotic companies.
Defenders of the status quo stress that the new research does not
undermine the entire edifice, as much data and advice have been generated
using other tools, such as relating executive compensation to corporate
performance.166 But critics welcome the spotlight the new research shines on
the often-obscure data behind the received wisdom in today’s governance
debates, from takeover defenses to shareholder voting methods.167
For investors, the new research highlights that it’s unwise to rely
blindly on assertions of what counts as good or bad governance from any
source—proxy advisors, data analytics vendors, professional service firms
or academics. All participants must probe the quality of the underlying
datasets, particularly whether governance scores are based on these
erroneous indexes.168
Scholars should be particularly attentive to the perceived causes of
these longstanding errors. For one, proprietary services such as ISS and
MSCI have incentives to maintain strict data control, selectively selling
access for substantial premiums to commercial clients.169 For another,
chief researchers in governance data analytics have been from fields such as
finance, not law. The researchers encourage lawyers to dig into the data
too—something the QSI is taking seriously, as reported in this Article.
In the context of received wisdom on good versus bad governance,
we compared an important annual study of Canadian boards with a study of
their company’s corporate performance. The Canadian investment
community tends to follow that of the U.S. closely, including on the
conventional wisdom of what counts as good governance.
In the 2020 installment, researchers at the University of Toronto’s
Johnston Centre for Corporate Governance Innovation defined a set of
boardroom best practices and then ranked companies based on their degree
165
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168 It also pays to understand the provider’s baseline for good governance. The literature
traditionally references corporate performance or shareholder returns as the baselines,
whereas today’s providers may stress different priorities associated with such movements as
impact investing, socially responsible investing or ESG investing. Cunningham, supra note
158.
169 States like Delaware, the leading charterer of corporations, charge hefty fees to obtain
corporate charters and make them available in technologically primitive formats. The
FHNT research team estimates the total cost of building a database from the Delaware
charters alone would be half a million dollars. Frankenreiter, supra note 14, at 17-18.
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of conformity with it.170 They established four categories — board
composition, director share ownership, shareholder rights, and disclosure —
and used 38 different indicators to rank 211 S&P/TSX issuers.171
In a study of “value-investor CEOs,” that is, CEOs who had the
investing skills necessary to deploy the cash company cash to the best valuemaximizing opportunity, Professor Athanassakos identified an elite group of
exceptional capital allocators, 41 Canadian and 167 American.172 The study
ranked companies by their success in capital allocation and then compared
portfolios comprised of those at the top versus the bottom. 173 On average, the
superior allocator portfolio outperformed the inferior one by 33 per cent in
cumulative three-year returns over several recent decades.174
Overlaps in the data sets are revealing. Of the best 41 Canadian
capital-allocating companies, 28 were also ranked in the University of
Toronto governance study.175 Among the leading capital allocators, however,
only four ranked in the top quarter of the governance rankings.176 By
contrast, some of the best capital allocators ranked lowest on the governance
scale.177 In related research, the QSI found that the superior allocators ranked
high in attracting QSs.178
CEO and Chair
Turning to governance, the U of T rankings give the highest marks
for conforming to standardized practices, without probing to what extent, if
at all, they may be expected to result in superior capital allocation or
shareholder stewardship.179 For instance, the study credits companies that
split the roles of chairman and CEO, but without recognizing that combining
them remains both common and apparently effective at a large portion of
public companies.180

See David Milstead, Board Games 2020: How We Ranked Canada’s Corporate Boards,
GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 30, 2020).
171 See BOARD GAMES: 19 YEARS OF SHINING A SPOTLIGHT INTO C ANADA 'S BOARDROOMS,
DAVID AND SHARON JOHNSTON CENTRE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INNOVATION,
ROTMAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, (Nov. 30, 2020).
172 See George Athanassakos, Do high quality shareholders gravitate to companies led by
good asset allocator CEOs? Ben Graham Centre Blog (May 11, (2020)),
https://www.ivey.uwo.ca/bengrahaminvesting/blog/2020/05/do-high-quality-shareholdersgravitate-to-companies-led-by-good-asset-allocator-ceos/; See also George Athanassakos
and Lawrence A. Cunningham, Pick one – conformist governance or good capital
allocation, FINANCIAL POST (Dec. 15, 2020).
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See id. See also Milstead, supra note 170.
176 These are: Emera, TC Energy, Fortis and Telus. See Milstead, supra note 170.
177 These included CGI, Restaurant Brands, Rogers Communications, and Westshore
Terminals. See id.
178 See infra Section III.E.1.
179 See Milstead, supra note 170.
180 See SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 18 (2020); id.
170

34

THE BUSINESS & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1]

Leading indexers and proxy advisers oppose combining the roles
because boards appoint and oversee the CEO.181 Having one person wear
both hats creates a conflict, they say. Yet many corporations thrive when led
by an outstanding person serving as both chair and chief, while others have
failed amid split roles—Enron is an example.182 After all, board chairs get
only one vote, so it comes down to the capability of the other directors. Good
ones neutralize such a conflict.
The data supports the view that context matters. About half the S&P
500 companies split the functions while the other half combines them.183
Despite indexer complaints, QSs are as likely to own stakes in companies
that split these functions as those that combine them, according to QSI data.
They look past formal checklists to substantive details.
Corporate performance results show that there is no right or wrong
answer, only “it depends.” Among 20 best-performing companies over the
past decade, the proportion with each practice matched the overall proportion
of companies using it.184 In other words, these practices add or subtract value
depending on context, especially the chief executive’s identity and the
board’s caliber, even the shareholder makeup.
Multiple share classes
Likewise, the U of T study credits “one-share, one-vote” capital
structures, thus penalizing dual-class companies, but without considering the
particular history, reasons and context for the structure at different
companies.
By convention, every corporate share has one vote; but in these
setups, insiders often get more votes for their shares than outsiders, putting
power in a controlling minority. Critics say that insulates controllers from
accountability and market discipline.185 They lobbied unsuccessfully to
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E.g., Institutional Shareholder Service, Proxy Voting Guidelines 19-20 (2020).
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Secret Sauce of Corporate Leadership, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
25, 2015); See also generally Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession,
42:2 THE J. OF CORP. L., 359, 383 (2016).
183 Companies remain nearly evenly divided over the practice; among the S&P 500, for
instance, 55% splitting the functions and 45% combining them. See SPENCER STUART
BOARD INDEX (2020) at 18. Our statistics are based on Spencer Stuart’s 2018 data for the
S&P 500 showing that 229 split and 245 combine; of these, 216 and 234, respectively,
appear in the QSDR. Of those splitting, 16% are in the top 10%, 40% in the top quarter, and
89% in the top half; of those combining, 28% are in the top 10%, 57% in the top quarter,
and 84% in the top half.
184 See Philip van Doorn, These Are the 20 Best-performing Stocks of the Past Decade,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2019). https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-are-the-20best-performing-stocks-of-the-past-decade-and-some-of-them-will-surprise-you-2019-1209.
185 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 602 (2017).
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outlaw the practice, but in 2017 prevailed upon indexers, such as S&P, to
exclude newly listed dual class stock.186
Yet even after the index exclusion, dual class companies continued
to go public, joining hundreds of others who have followed the practice for
decades.187 These include such long-term stalwarts as Aflac, Berkshire
Hathaway, Estee Lauder Companies and The New York Times Company, as
well as contemporary starlets like Alphabet (Google), Facebook, and
Snap.188 The practice is ideal for certain company types, especially those
needing quality shareholders to support long-term businesses, such as spirits
(Brown Forman), or those with valuable roots in families (Tootsie Roll
Industries) or entrepreneurs (Nike).189
Terms also vary, from simple board seat allocations to complex
control formulas. Some even protect outsiders against insider tyranny, such
as at McCormick & Co. and United Parcel Service.190 It’s no wonder, yet
again, that QSs are not averse to owning shares in dual class companies,
according to QSI data.
In short, while corporate tradition provides shareholders with onevote-per-share, alternative shareholder voting rules abound. Examples
include dual class structures giving different votes-per-share to different
classes, as well as time-weighted voting, more votes to longer-held shares.191
QSs are attracted to many such companies, including those listed in Table
III.1, which rank in the top quartile of QS density. The data suggest that QSs
examine capital structures on a case-by-case basis rather than making blanket
condemnations (or proclamations).192

186

Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Discussion Draft: Investor as Owner
Subcommittee of SEC Investor Advisory Committee 2 (2017); see also Amy Deen
Westbrook and David A. Westbrook, Snapchat’s Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms,
46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 866 (2019).
187 See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 1229, 1266, 69 (2019).
188 Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List 1-2, 5, 15-16 (2017).
189 Cunningham, supra note 9, at 45; see also id at 2, 11, 16. See also Dorothy S. Lund,
Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2019).
190 See generally Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List 10, 17
(2017) (voting structures that cap voting power after a given ownership level threshold help
ensure powerful insider shareholders cannot dictate over smaller shareholders).
191See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased
Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. The importance of QSs warrants considering “quality voting”—
more votes to longer-held shares owned by concentrated shareholders. See Lynne L. Dallas
& Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L.
541, 564 (2016). See also Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, Loyalty-Shares: Rewarding
Long-term Investors, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86 (2013).
192 Comparing the CII’s list of 225 companies, supra note 188, with the QSDR, 135
companies appear on both lists. The data largely followed a random pattern, rather than
being skewed, with 11% in the top 10%; 30% in the top 25%Q; and 64% appeared in the
50%.
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Aflac
Erie Indemnity
McCormick & Co.
Berkshire Hathaway
Estee-Lauder Companies
Moog
Brown-Forman
John Wiley & Sons
Nike
Constellation Brands
Expedia
Hershey
Discovery Comm.
Graham Holdings
New York Times Co.
DISH Network
Hyatt Hotels
United Parcel Service
Table III.1: Dual Class and QS Density

Empirical evidence on the effects of time-weighted voting is
limited.193 Only a handful of U.S. companies currently maintain timeweighted voting: Aflac, Carlisle, J.M. Smucker, Quaker Chemical, and
Synovus Financial.194 A few others once employed time-weighted voting but
have since rescinded it: CenturyTel, Church & Dwight, Cincinnati Milacron,
Roper, and Shaw Group.195 Despite the small sample size, all five U.S.
companies that have time-weighted voting rank high in attracting QSs.196
Director Share Ownership
The U of T ranking credits boards that require directors to own a
certain amount of the company’s stock, when it would obviously be
preferable to credit directors who buy large stakes without being required to
do so.197 Similarly, the rankings weight handling of stock options heavily —
in terms of hurdles, vesting periods, dilution — without crediting companies
who simply avoid using them due to their questionable effects and contested
accounting.198
193

See David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting and
the U.S. Public Company, 72 BUS. L. 295, 307 (2017).
194 Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List 1, 3, 12, 15 (2017).
195 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a charter amendment adopting timeweighted voting in Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
196 Much as with the debate over dual class and the contrary QSI findings are the debate and
findings concerning staggered board of director terms. Both debates reflect a similar
substance versus form battle. At some companies, every director stands for election every
year while at others only one-third do, each for three-year terms. Critics oppose such threeyear terms as impairing board accountability. See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 39. Yet a
staggered board may enable a company to embrace a longer time horizon than one that can
turn over completely in any year. Value arises from such binding commitments to long-term
strategies. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe, & Saura Masconale, Is the Staggered
Board Debate Really Settled?, 167 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2019). These realities are
reflected in historical company practices, which vary. Staggered boards are used at nearly
half of Russell 3000 companies, although the figure among S&P 500 companies has fallen
to about 60, in response to indexer pressure in recent years. QSs grasp this point too: they
invest just as much in companies with staggered boards as without them, according to the
following data analysis. We compared the 61 companies among the S&P 500 with staggered
boards to the first 61 in alphabetical order that do not. We related each group of 61 to the
QSDR. The data showed a very slight preference for unitary boards: among the top decile of
QSDR companies, 8 had classified boards versus 22 unitary; among the top quarter of
QSDR companies, 25 had classified boards versus 34 unitary; and among the top half were
52 and 53, indistinguishable.
197 Athanassakos & Cunningham, supra note 172; Milstead, supra note 170.
198 Id.
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To QSs, director share ownership is a signal about stewardship:
directors will act most like shareholders when they are shareholders; the
higher the stakes, the more passionate the stewardship. The underlying logic
can be seen by considering the field of venture capital, where the effects of
a company’s major shareholder-directors are clear.
The standard-bearer here is the legendary George Ohrstrom.
Through his venture firm, Ohrstrom sagely guided the incubation of such
durable companies as Carlisle, Dover and Roper Technologies.199 While no
intelligent investor blindly follows others or simplistic formulas, its pays to
watch what the Ohrstroms of the world do.
Beyond venture capital, the research indicates that among large
public companies today, a high proportion of QSs correlates with superior
corporate performance. In companies that lead the charts in both shareholder
quality and performance, a common feature is at least one director with large
long-term personal stakes. In addition to those mentioned in what follows,
some examples appear in Table III.2.200
Abbott Labs
General Dynamics
Aptar Group
Illinois Tool Works
AutoNation
Jack Henry & Associates
Bright Horizons
O’Reilly Automotive
Cincinnati Financial
Public Storage
Credit Acceptance
Ross Stores
Danaher
Selective Insurance Group
Gartner Inc.
Table III.2: Substantial Director-Owner QS Density

Some CEOs publicly attest to the value of such directors. One is
Mike Jackson, CEO for more than twenty years at AutoNation. The
company, owner of a network of car dealers, attracted an impressive list of
quality shareholders over those decades. From among these, two joined the
board, whom Jackson credits with vastly improved corporate performance.
Each held 15-16% of the stock for more than a decade: investor Eddie
Lampert tutored board colleagues on capital allocation and Michael Larson
of the Gates Foundation counseled them on disciplined, patient long-term
thinking.201
The board of Credit Acceptance Corporation, lender to sub-prime
borrowers, boasts two quality shareholders: Scott Vassalluzzo, of Prescott
199

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: These 15 Companies are run in a Warren
Buffet-like way, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 27, 2021).
200 Director ownership rankings are based on data for director share ownership in WRDS's
ISS Directors database, presenting 2019 data for S&P 400, 500, and 600 companies.
Director profiles were obtained from individual company websites and/or proxy statements.
Featured companies are those whose board included at least one independent director with
significant long-term holdings in the company (a QS), ranking in the top five percent of the
QSDR, and outperforming indexes described in Section I.
201 CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 8, at 43.
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General Partners, which owns 10% of the stock, and Tom Tryforos, who
teaches the fundamentals of traditional investing at Columbia Business
School.202 CEO Brett Roberts attests to the enduring value of their board
service, stressing in a shareholder letter how Tryforos’s perspective as an
investor helped managers appreciate that all corporate decisions must be
tested in terms of a minimum return on capital.203
Many other companies adept at attracting quality shareholders have
named some to their boards: Berkshire Hathaway in 2005 appointed Sandy
Gottesman of First Manhattan, the company’s largest shareholder after
Warren Buffett since 1966; Constellation Software has since going public in
2006 benefited from the board service of Steve Scotchmer, a distinguished
Canadian investor and owner of a large personal stake for decades; and for
many years Enstar Group’s board included Chuck Akre, a noted QS.
Through 2013 when The Washington Post Company sold its
flagship newspaper, the company had since 1976 saved nearly one billion
dollars in pension plan costs thanks to savvy investment advice given by the
prominent investors Sandy Gottesman and Bill Ruane.204 Those mavens
were suggested and introduced to the company by one of its earliest and
revered QSs: Buffett.205 Another Washington Post veteran is Alan Spoon, of
Polaris Partners, also a shareholder-oriented director adding value at such
companies as Danaher, Fortive and IAC, and formerly Cable One.206
Identifying companies with such outstanding directors is not as easy
as it should be (though the original data is in public securities filings).207 You
might expect them to be identified by activist shareholders in contested
director elections squaring off with incumbents. But such fights often pivot
instead on specific strategy and executive leadership and the challengers
rarely acquire large stakes on spec.
It would be helpful if large institutional investors rated director share
ownership highly in their assessments, but that is unfortunately not the case.
The guidelines of many indexers and advisors, for instance, emphasize

202

Id. at 43-44
Id. at 44.
204
See “Letter of Donald Graham to Shareholders of the Washington Post Co.” (2003),
reprinted in Lawrence A. Cunningham, Dear Shareholder (Petersfield: Harriman House,
2020).
178A Warren Buffet, “The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville,” Hermes, 1984.
205 Warren Buffet, The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville, HERMES, 1984.
206 Meet Fortive: Board of Directors, FORTIVE, https://fortive.com/meet-fortive#board, (last
visited Sep. 15, 2021); Directors: Alan Spoon, IAC, https://www.iac.com/directors/alanspoon (last visited Sep. 14, 2021).
207 Proxy statements disclose director ownership in a section entitled “Security Ownership
of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management” found in a company’s annual proxy
statement (Schedule 14A). SEC forms 3, 4 and 5, as well as Schedule 13D and 13G, also
track corporate insider transactions.
203
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instead features such as director independence from management, meeting
attendance records, and number of other boards a director serves on.208
The governance community has successfully advocated for
corporate policies requiring or exhorting minimum director stock ownership.
A common benchmark is to own shares worth triple the annual board
retainer, within a few years of starting service—a goal increasingly
facilitated by board compensation paid in shares.209
While this is probably desirable, the strongest signal of alignment is
directors who, on their own rather than due to company policy, buy
substantial stakes in their company. The logic is as easy as the simple slogan
“we eat our own cooking.”
*****
Why might indexers and other critics universally condemn corporate
practices that QSs accept and that may enhance a company’s performance?
Different business models may explain: indexers address the market as a
whole while QSs focus on specific companies.
Indexers prescribe policies expected to benefit the overall market,
on average, not particular businesses. The size and reach of indexers—
commanding around one-third of public equity—give them outsized
influence, and a wide critical following. But they have small stewardship
staffs and minuscule budgets to address particular companies, according to
research by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst—no more than 45 people
covering well more than 3,000 U.S. companies.210
QSs appreciate that indexers may present “best practices” in general.
Yet without examining context, some companies will not get the governance
that is best for them. The indexing business model makes one-size-fits-all
governance an imperative. But that should not stop QSs or companies from
fashioning a tailored approach.
D. Director Diversity211
A broader consensus seems to support director share ownership and
board diversity, as these are advocated by many different kinds of
shareholders, especially indexers, and fully embraced by QSs. But there are
important differences in emphasis or approach.
208

See generally ISS United States Procedures & Policies (Non-Compensation) Frequently
Asked Questions, April 21, 2021 (showing general guidance regarding how ISS analyzes
certain issues and determines recommendations for companies).
209 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 141–43 (2020). See also, e.g., ISS United States
Procedures & Policies (Non-Compensation) Frequently Asked Questions 22 (2021).
210 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 6, at 2077-78.
211 This section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: S&P Corporate
Boards Lack Diversity, but theses top companies are leading change – and the stock market
rewards them, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2020, 9:38 AM)
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-500-corporate-boards-lack-diversity-but-these-topcompanies-are-leading-change-and-the-stock-market-rewards-them-2020-10-23; in turn
drawing on Lawrence A. Cunningham, Board Gender Diversity: Debate and Practice, 63
CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 244 (2020).
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Companies appeared to react under public compulsion when adding
diversity to boards in the aftermath of the national conversation on race
sparked during the tumultuous summer of 2020. 212 Due attention zeroed in
on racial and gender inclusion across the nation’s boardrooms. You’ll see
both progress and challenges. One discovery: QSs appreciate board
diversity.
Few dispute that there has been female and minority
underrepresentation on corporate boards compared to the population.
Although 13.4% of the U.S. population are Black, close to 200 companies in
the S&P 500 have no Black director and only 8% of that cohort’s directors
are Black, based on data collated by Institutional Shareholder Services
analyzed by the QSI.213
While every S&P 500 board has at least one female director today,
women hold a little over 25% of the total seats.214 Among the broader Russell
3000, just over 24% of seats are held by women, although 61% of those
companies have 20% or more female members, according to the advocacy
group 5050 Women on Boards.215
All these percentages are up from a decade ago,216 and there is
reasoned debate over the pace of change. But disagreement rages on the
causes of underrepresentation. Among disputed causes: lack of prioritization
by boards; gender and racial stereotypes or in-group bias, and
underrepresentation of women or minorities in traditional pools or pipelines
(which may, in turn, owe to stereotypes and biases).217
One reason the rate of progress is slower than some desire may be
the mixed rationales for the quest. There are two broad potential rationales
for board diversity: (1) the quantifiable economic interests of corporations
and their shareholders, and/or (2) the qualitative social aspects of group
decision-making and intuitions of fairness.

212

See Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics, 130 YALE L. J. F.
869, 884–85 (2021).
213 Quality Shareholders Initiative, QSI Database of Quality Shareholders (on file with the
author and the QSI).
214 Jeff Green, Women Gained 22 Seats on S&P 500 Boards in January Surge, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 23, 2021, 6:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-23/womengained-22-seats-on-s-p-500-boards-in-january-surge; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Board Gender Diversity: Debate and Practice, 63 CAN. BUS. L. J. 244 (2020).
215
Gender Diversity Index First Quarter 2021 Key Findings, 5050 WOMEN ON BOARDS, at
1, https://5050wob.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Q1-2021Infographic_Final_EQUILAR.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2021); 2020 Women On Boards
Gender Diversity Index: 2020 Progress of Women Corporate Directors by Company Size,
State and Industry Sector, 5050 WOMEN ON BOARDS, at 3, https://5050wob.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/2020-Gender-Diversity-Index-Report-FINAL.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2021). See also Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Top 10 Topics for
Directors: Board Diversity, NEWSTEX (Feb 06, 2020).
216 See Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, supra note 215. See also Lisa M. Fairfax,
The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for
Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 799-800 (2005).
217 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 216, at 799-810.
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Empirical research on whether diversity improves corporate
economic performance is equivocal. Numerous studies find a positive
association between gender diversity and economic performance, including
those of Catalyst and Morgan Stanley Research.218 But almost none find any
causation, according to a comprehensive survey by Deborah Rhode and
Amanda Packel.219
The data may reflect how high-performance leads to diversity, as
much as that diversity leads to high performance. Testing the effects of board
diversity on economic performance is complicated by the variety of relevant
contexts to consider — such as board and company size, geography or
industry — as well as the variety of board settings, such as addressing
acquisitions, dividends, executive pay, financial reporting or corporate
culture.
The social case is more compelling.220 First, the strongest general
argument for board diversity is simple: the best group decisions result from
a number of people with a wide variety of backgrounds viewing an issue
from many angles.221 It is also clear that boards should reflect a corporation’s
various constituents, meaning diversity not only of race and gender but
varying ethnic, cultural and other personal characteristics.222
Mere tokenism won’t suffice. Investor groups suggest that only with
a minimum representation of at least 20% do contributions of outsider groups
cease being representative of that group but get judged on merit. 223 That
occurs more readily when members are selected voluntarily rather than by
compulsion.224 That’s one reason why legal diversity quotas, such as
California has enacted for companies headquartered there,225 may miss their
mark.
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See, e.g., David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 36 (2004). CATALYST, BOTTOM LINE: CONNECTING CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE AND GENDER DIVERSITY 1 (2004); Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter
(Quick Take), CATALYST (June 24, 2020), https://www.catalyst.org/research/why-diversityand-inclusion-matter/; Eva T Zlotnicka et al., Sustainable and Responsible: A Framework
for Gender Diversity in the Workplace, MORGAN STANLEY RSCH., Mar. 31, 2016, at 2.
219 Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL J. CORP. L. 377, 390 (2014); see also Amanda K.
Packel, Government Intervention into Board Composition: Gender Quotas in Norway and
Diversity Disclosures in the United States, 21 STAN. J. L. & BUS. 192, 201 (2016) (reviewing
AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY (2015)).
220 See, e.g., CATALYST, supra note 218. See also Fairfax, supra note 216, at 810-11.
221 See Fairfax, supra note 216, at 831-32.
222 See id. at 820, 21.
223 See e.g., 30% Club Canadian Investor Group, Statement of Intent, (Sept. 2017),
https://30percentclub.org/assets/uploads/30_percent_Club_Canadian_Investor_Statement_U
pdated_May_2019_v2.pdf.
224 See generally Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The
Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, Q. J.OF ECON. 137,
139-140 (2012) (noting that forced board diversity may lead to underexperienced
individuals being appointed to boards and can adversely affect firm value).
225 Assemb. B. No. 979 (Cal. Sept. 30, 2020).
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As for what shareholders might think, the QSI ranks most of those
identified by the 2020 Women on Boards as having the greatest percentage
of women directors. Among those, 70% are in the top half for QS density.226
The nineteen in the top decile are listed in Table III.4.
Alliant Energy
Johnson & Johnson
Am. States Water
Kaiser Aluminum
American Tower
Pepsico
Am. Water Works
Sensient Technologies
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.
Stryker Corporation
Associated Banc-Corp.
Sysco Corporation
Eli Lilly & Company
Walt Disney Company
Estee Lauder Companies
Waters Corporation
HNI Corporation
Xcel Energy, Inc.
Intl. Flavors & Fragrances
Table III.4: Women on Boards and QS Density
Concerning Black directors, the QSI crunched the data from
Institutional Shareholder Services of S&P 500 companies. One notable
finding: a select group of such companies boasts three Black directors over
the past few years, all representing at least 20% of the board. All nine of
those companies also in the QSDR rank in the top half, as listed in Table
III.5.227
DTE Energy
Public Service Enter.
Eversource Energy
Southern Co.
Marriott
Verizon
Nike
WEC Energy
Omnicom Group
Table III.5: Black Directors on Boards and QS Density

What might explain these associations? The correlation between QS
density and diversity, of both gender and race, may be due to the long-term
horizons of QSs. Compared to the short-term view of transient shareholders,
QSs benefit more from the multiple viewpoints on boards that come from
diversity.
The association between QS density and multiple Black directors on
a board may reflect the focused investment approach of QSs. Indexers, who
own small stakes in every company, may have to be content with quota-type
226

The 2020 Women on Boards' Honor Roll Companies for 2017 include 176 companies
that have been Winning 'W' Companies for seven consecutive years, 2011-2017. Of those
176 companies, 133 appeared in the QSDR. Among those, 70% of the honorees were in the
top half in the QSDR (92/133), 40% were in the top quarter (54/133), and 15% were in the
top decile (19/133). See calculations infra Appendix B.
227 From ISS data, we selected all Black directors holding office during 2018 or 2019 or
both, eliminated duplicate names, then listed the companies, and, using a word count
function, counted the companies appearing most, then went to their websites to verify the
composition of their current boards.
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guidelines advocating one minority director per board. QSs, who focus on
particular companies, care about individual identities, which may result in
greater diversity than a quota system would yield.
There may be a long way to go on board gender and racial diversity,
and it remains true that the social case is stronger at present than the
economic one. Everyone also agrees that director quality remains paramount.
But these observations do suggest that America’s best shareholders and
board diversity go hand-in-hand.
E. What Else Matters?
The prevailing literature on corporate governance—as well as ESG
and other variations—seem to fixate attention on variables whose reliability
is now contested and whose relevance is put in doubt by the QSI research.
Beyond such topics reside many of greater interest to QSs and that therefore
should be of greater interest to researchers and scholars. The following
highlights four examples of what matters most that’s been examined least.
1. Capital Allocation.228 Effective capital allocators put every
corporate dollar to its highest use, from organic or acquired growth to share
buybacks or dividends. They do so with an investors’ mindset that all
managers and shareholders would profit from understanding.
An elite group of 167 exceptional capital allocators is identified in
research by Professor George Athanassakos.229 The study ranks companies
by capital allocation success and then compares portfolios comprised of
those at the top versus the bottom.230 On average, the superior allocator
portfolio outperformed the inferior one by 33%, in terms of cumulative threeyear returns, over several recent decades.231
Most such companies are also in the QSDR. Among companies on
both lists, the capital allocators rank disproportionately high for QS density:
26% in the top decile of QS density; 56% in the top quarter; and 75% in the
top half. Here is a sampling of companies topping the combined lists of deft
allocators and QS density:
Amphenol Corp.
228

Jack Henry & Assocs.

This sub-section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Why companies
that spend their capital wisely are smart places for your money, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 31,
2020, 9:31 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-savvy-companies-know-thatdoing-this-one-thing-well-is-the-secret-to-attracting-long-term-stable-shareholders-2020-1029.
229 See George Athanassakos, Do Value Investor CEOs Outperform? (April 20, 2020)
(unpublished working paper) (on file with Western University). The assertion in the text is
based on comparing the companies identified by Professor Athanassakos as led by
exceptional capital allocators to the QSDR. Of the 167 companies identified by Professor
Athanassakos, 140 are in the QSDR. Among those, 26% are in the top 10% of the QSDR;
56% are in the top quarter; and 75% are in the top half. See also Athanassakos, supra note
229.
230See Athanassakos, supra note 229.
231 Id.
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Ansys Inc.
Moody's Corp.
Balchem Corp.
Roper Technologies Inc.
Danaher Corp.
Stryker Corp.
Illinois Tool Works
Texas Instruments
Table III.6: Capital Allocation and QS Density

What sets these managers and shareholders apart? Their emphasis
differs from quarterly earnings per share (EPS) favored by traders or market
capitalization that’s of interest to indexers. They stress instead intrinsic
value, long-term performance metrics such as return on invested capital
(ROIC), and analytics like internal rate of return (IRR).
ROIC is a good way to measure capital allocation effectiveness. At
the corporate level, a good proxy takes bottom line performance, such as
annual net income, as a percentage of average capital invested by
shareholders. Individual projects are evaluated in terms of IRR, starting with
capital expenditures to expand existing businesses as well as research and
development budgets.232
Successful capital allocators are especially cautious when it comes
to acquisitions.233 They insist on paying a price below a target company’s
intrinsic value and delivering an expected return that exceeds a preset hurdle
rate. Such an investor mindset guards against managerial appetites for
empire building and temptations of rosy forecasts about synergies, which
often lead to acquisitions that destroy capital.
On share buybacks, some favor them because they increase earnings
per share simply by reducing shares outstanding. That may boost incentivebased pay for managers and spur stock price for traders ready to cash in. But
capital allocators see buybacks as investments. To them, buybacks are
rational only when price is below a conservative estimate of per share
intrinsic value. (That’s why they shun buyback quota programs.)
Finally, on dividends, many capital allocators see them as rational
only whenever other uses of capital — such as reinvestment, acquisitions or
buybacks — are unattractive.234 To many, all excess capital should be
returned to the shareholders — no cash hoarding.
Others recognize that dividend policy shapes the shareholder base.
A no-dividend policy may suit a largely taxable shareholder base while
regular dividends give shareholders a reason to stay put in troubled times.
Regular dividends can lengthen holding periods, marginalizing transients,
and induce larger positions, marginalizing indexers.

232

Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Why Companies That Spend Their Capital Wisely
Are Smart Places for Your Money, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 31, 2020, 9:31 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-savvy-companies-know-that-doing-this-onething-well-is-the-secret-to-attracting-long-term-stable-shareholders-2020-10-29.
233 Id at 3.
234 Id.
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2. Sustainable Moats.235 Companies that attract a high density of QSs
tend to boast competitive advantages that protect business performance
against a variety of threats. Often referred to as moats, these include
economies of scale, credence value, intellectual property, network effects,
distribution systems, and brand strength.236
Morningstar publishes a list of some 500 companies regarded as having
among the strongest moats, 200 of which are in the QSDR database.237 Of
those 200 companies common to both, one-third are in the top decile of the
QSDR; two-thirds are in the top quarter; and the overwhelming majority—
nearly 90%—are in the top half. This confirms widely known anecdotal
evidence that moats attract QSs. Table III.7 lists companies topping both
lists:
Roper
Stryker
Jack Henry
Moody’s

VeriSign
ADP
Colgate-Palmolive
Eli Lilly
Accenture
Mastercard
3M
Domino’s Pizza
Table III.7: Moats and QS Density

Among moats, brand strength appears to be a particular magnet for
QSs. There is a strong association between managers regarded as the best
stewards of great brands and QSI rankings. For instance, among U.S.
managers ranked in the global elite for brand guardianship, virtually all are
in the top half of the QSI rankings.238 Table III.8 lists exemplars.
Amazon
Cisco
Disney
Estee Lauder
235

FedEx
Home Depot
IBM
Johnson & Johnson

P&G
UnitedHealth Group
Visa
Walmart

This sub-section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Wanted: Stock
Investors with Time and Money to Support Profitable, Well-Run Companies,
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/are-you-astock-investor-with-time-and-money-these-top-companies-want-you-2020-10-20 and
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Why Companies That Spend Their Capital Wisely Are
Smart Places for Your Money, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 31, 2020, 9:31 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-savvy-companies-know-that-doing-this-onething-well-is-the-secret-to-attracting-long-term-stable-shareholders-2020-10-29.
236 See Kanuri & McLeod, Sustainable competitive advantage and stock performance: the
case for wide moat stocks, 48 APPLIED ECONOMICS 5117, 5119 (2016).
237 Wide-Moat Focus Index, MORNINGSTAR, https://www.morningstar.com/bestinvestments/wide-moat-focus.
238 The list of the top 100 brand managers is taken from Global 500 2019 The Annual
Report on the World’s Most Valuable Brands, BRAND FINANCE 36-37 (Jan. 2019),
https://brandfinance.com/wp-content/uploads/1/global_500_2019_locked_4.pdf (“Brand
Guardianship Index”). Of the 38 U.S. managers on the Brand Guardian Index, 36 of them
are in the QSDR. Among those, more than one-third are in the top 10% of the QSDR; 75%
are in the top quarter; and 97% are in the top half.

46

THE BUSINESS & FINANCE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1]

Table III.8: Brands and QS Density
A more intriguing reason why high densities of QSs are associated
with corporate outperformance is that the QS cohort is itself a source of
competitive advantage, akin to network effects. These arise when a system’s
value increases as more people use it. In most cases, network effects
represent a tangible benefit to customers, as with fax machines in the old
days and social media today.
Similar advantages can arise from a network of QSs. As a group,
QSs are more likely than other major shareholder cohorts -- such as indexers
or transients -- to care about the identity of fellow shareholders. This “birds
of a feather” effect is visible among the companies held by leading QSs, such
as those listed in Table III.9.
Baker Brothers
Baupost Group
Berkshire Hathaway
Blue Harbour

Cantillon Capital
Capital Research Global
Fiduciary Management
Gates Foundation

Kensico Capital
Lone Pine Capital
Southeastern
Temasek Holdings

Table III.9: QSs Attracting QSs
Companies tap into the broader QS ecosystem, where members tend
to know one another or know of one another. Resulting network effects
reinforce advantages of a high-density QS base of patient and knowledgeable
shareholders.
The QS cohort may also help brand a company. After all, consumer
brands become competitive advantages when they assure that consumers
recognize product features. A corporate reputation for attracting QSs is a
competitive advantage when a company repeatedly commits to the values
patient focused shareholders appreciate, including long-term performance
metrics and rational capital allocation policies.
3. Annual Letters to Shareholders.239
Investors
ask
what
resources to consult when hunting for great companies. Good advice is to
read the shareholder letter the company sends out every year. Next to the
financial figures, it is perhaps the most important and accessible source of
valuable information. These communications reveal a lot about a company
and its CEO. Some obfuscate, others patronize, and many appear to be
ghostwritten, but the best ones share business insights that help readers
understand a company.
Numerous surveys of shareholder letters rank them according to
various indicators of quality, some statistical and some judgmental. Despite
such variety, the same names appear often in both published lists and private
polls—invariably starting with Buffett—and they tend to attract a high level
This sub-section is adapted from Cunningham’s Quality Investing columns in
MarketWatch of November 4, 2020.
239
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of QSs. One expert on corporate shareholder letters, Laura Rittenhouse, in a
recent annual ranking, designated the top 25 by her measures, the vast
majority of which rank among the highest in terms of attracting QS.”240
ADP
Amazon.com
Becton, Dickinson
Charles Schwab
Clorox
Costco

CVS
Microsoft
Edison International
Netflix
General Mills
Sherwin-Williams
General Motors
Southwest Airlines
Google
Texas Instruments
Honeywell
Travelers
Lockheed Martin
Table III.10: Shareholder Letters and QS Density

4. Long-Tenured CEOs.241 Companies boasting the longest tenured
CEOs also tend to attract QSs. In recent years, the average CEO tenure of
large U.S. public companies has risen to ten years from seven (the average
varies year-to-year and across statistical methods).242 Many CEOs create
greatest value during the “golden” years 11- to 15, when knowledge and
experience may be optimal.243 Some experts suggest 10 years may be ideal
for most: long enough to contribute a lot, but short enough to avoid
complacency.244
The QSI identified CEOs with tenures of at least 10 years as of the
beginning of 2020 from the QSDR. Of the 100 companies making the cut,
one-fourth of the long-tenured CEOs ranked in the top decile for attracting
QSs, one-half in the top quarter, and almost all (85) ranked in the top half.
In other words, long-tenured CEOs are associated with high-quality
shareholders.
The longevity/quality correlation is particularly robust for
companies with a tradition of long CEO tenures — one long-serving CEO
followed by one or more others. Leading examples: EcoLab has had seven
CEOs in its 99-year history; Emerson Electric has had three CEOs over the
past 66 years; and Amphenol whose current and prior CEO together served
25 years (Richard Norwitt and Martin Loeffler).

240

See Rittenhouse Rankings Press Release, Companies Excelling in Rittenhouse Candor
Analytics™ Substantially Outperform the Market in 2016 (December 13, 2016). The
assertion in the text is based on comparing the listing in Rittenhouse Rankings to the QS
density rankings contained in QS Density Ranking, described in Section II.
241 This sub-section is adapted from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Opinion: Long-Tenured
CEOs Can Take a Business from Good to Great — and these Companies Have Them,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/long-tenured-ceoscan-take-a-business-from-good-to-great-and-these-companies-have-them11618380952?mod=quality-investing.
242 Chip Cutter, New Thinking Emerges on Optimal Tenure for a CEO, WALL STREET
JOURNAL 4-5 (February 3, 2020).
243 See James M. Citrin et al. The CEO Life Cycle, HARV. BUS. REV. (2019), available at
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/hbr-ceolifecycle/hbr_ceo_lifecycle_spencerstuart.pdf.
244 See, e.g., Cutter, supra note 242.
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CEOs come and go for many reasons — from retirement or better
job opportunities to ouster due to subpar performance or a bad business
model. But it’s hard to stick around without sustained long-term
performance — and a supportive shareholder base. What seems to unite this
cohort of long tenures with high QS density is a shared appreciation for longterm value creation: the CEO has a long-term vision for success and QSs are
prepared to see it through with the company.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Quality Shareholders Initiative builds on impressive research
into shareholder demographics and behavior. Continued probing of this
cohort will be increasingly valuable as U.S. shareholders exercise their
voting power on the increasingly important topics facing them, whether firmspecific mergers and board elections to broader social topics of diversity and
climate change. Further research opportunities in this area are vast.
For instance, it is possible that not all QSs behave in a
similar way. Might it be that there are two different kinds of QS? Might
some exercise their position for positive corporate good while others do so
to extract private gain? Skimming the lists of top and bottom performers
with high QS density, what is the exact makeup and behavior of this
cohort? Consider inside ownership by a single executive and his/her family
versus other forms of QSs such as insurance companies or mutual funds. In
other words, not all long-term high conviction (“LTHC”) shareholders are
QSs.
Some LTHC’s exert influence or control to benefit themselves at the
expense of other shareholders. Research could examine the effects of high
levels of inside ownership or the presence of controlling shareholders on
both relative QS density and relative corporate performance. If so, under the
QS rubric, the designation of QS would be retained for the symbiont portion
of the LTHC quadrant, while calling out the parasitic portion of the quadrant
and specifically excluding them. (Consider it the inverse of the “indexer and
closet indexer” to be the “true QS and the phantom QS”.)
In addition, further tools and techniques can be refined to deal with
some of the definitional challenges of Quality Shareholders. Despite taking
care to delineate a range of metrics probing conviction, gaps may remain—
for instance, concentration is almost certainly an imprecise measure of
conviction. Consider two reciprocal examples of the problem from real
world settings.
First, a mutual fund family might seed a dozen funds, each heavily
concentrated (say 5-10 stocks); a few years on, some of these naturally
outperform without effort and fund markets these to attract AUM. This might
pass most statistical definitions for the conviction aspect of QS, but it is the
fund family’s behavior is inconsistent with the philosophy or reasons for
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empowering certain shareholders. Such strategies could even be used as a
subterfuge to game the system.
Empirical research could continue to refine the definitions or
develop or other tools to distinguish genuine QS from such phantom QS.
Policy and practice research could do so by drafting language for charter
provisions that express the purpose of QS empowerment, defines terms
accordingly. Language would then put the burden of persuasion on the
shareholder wishing to exercise associated rights to prove eligibility to the
corporation’s satisfaction, that it is a genuine QS rather than a strategic
artifact or subterfuge.
For the reciprocal case, some institutional investors employ high
conviction managers who would be QSs but also impose limits on permissive
positions. Forced sales can result to reduce average holding periods or
concentration thresholds, though not the manager’s conviction. Such effects
might disqualify such shareholders from exercising QS rights, though they
may be expected to exercise those rights more suitably than fellow
shareholders who met the numerical QS thresholds. For theory, this is less
worrisome in a sense because they almost entirely ceased to be shareholders
for whatever reason; for practice, research might investigate whether
corporations offering additional rights in such settings might, as a matter of
theory or practice, induce such funds to alter their restrictions.
Further research could contract the scope to consider whether
particular industries or segments attract QSs or expand the scope to consider
the shareholder demographics in other leading industrial countries, such as
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
Research into the policies and practices that may attract or repel different
shareholder types remains of great ongoing interest.
For instance, we are investigating the correlation between
QS density and various measures of competitive advantage and of insider
share ownership. Similarly, refinements can be made in the scope of the
definition of QS. For instance, we are examining the degree to which various
shareholders vote on corporate resolutions based on their own independent
judgment as compared with reliance upon the recommendations of
institutional investor proxy advisers such as ISS or Glass Lewis.
Performance results and implications warrant continued
examination. Our initial research is the product of hindsight. A more
convincing test would be longitudinal. A research proposal that Cunningham
and the Initiative aim to implement: construct a portfolio of high QS density
investments, chosen ex ante, with performance results to be isolated and
reported five years hence.
In constructing such a portfolio, in addition to fundamental analysis,
it is worth trying to determine whether any of the various levers noted earlier
are more (or less) frequently used by the top (and bottom) performers. If so,
portfolio design could be weighted in favor of companies applying such
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levers. The QSI respectfully encourages and welcomes further research into
this topic likely to be of increasing importance.
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QS Firms
AKO Capital
Akre Capital
Ariel Investments
Aristotle Capital
Artisan Partners
Atlanta Investment
Avenir Corp.
Baillie Gifford & Co.
Baker Brothers
Baron Funds
Barrow Hanley
Baupost
Beck, Mack & Oliver
Blue Harbour
Brandes
Broad Run
Brown Bros. Harriman
Burgundy Capital
Cantillon Capital
Capital Research
Capital World
Cedar Rock
Davis Selected Advisers
Diamond Hill
D.F. Dent

Dodge & Cox
Douglass Winthrop
E. S. Barr
Eagle Capital
Ensemble Capital
Fiduciary Mgmt.
Findlay Park
First Manhattan
First Pacific
Franklin Mutual
Gardner Russo
Giverny Capital
Fundsmith
Harris Assoc. (Oakmark)
Hartford Funds
Hotchkiss & Wiley
Irdian Asset Mgmt.
Jackson National Asset
Kahn Brothers
Kensico Capital
Klingenstein Fields
Lafayette Investments
Lee, Danner & Bass
London Co. of Virginia
Longview Partners
Lourd Capital
Lyrical Asset Mgmt.
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Mar Vista
Massachusetts Financial
Matrix Capital
Medley Brown
Mraz, Amerine
Neuberger Berman
Polen Capital
Ruane Cunniff
Scopia Capital
Sleep, Zakaria
Smead Capital
Southeastern Asset Mgmt.
Speece Thorson
Sprucegrove
State Farm Insurance
Stockbridge Partners
T. Rowe Price
Temasek Holdings
Tweedy Browne
W. H. Reaves
Wallace Capital
Water Street Capital
WCM
Wedgewood Partners
Weitz Inv. Mgmt.
Wellington
Westport

QS Attractors
3M
Abbott Labs
Accenture
Air Products
Alleghany
Alphabet (Google)
Amazon
Amerco (U-Haul)
American Tower
Anthem
AutoNation
Berkshire Hathaway
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Brookfield
Cable One
Capital One
CarMax
Churchill Downs
Clorox
Coca-Cola
Constellation Brands

Credit Acceptance
Crown Holdings
Danaher
Dover
Enstar
Genuine Parts
Graham Holdings (WaPo)
Hormel Foods
Illinois Tool Works
Intel
Johnson & Johnson
Kimberly Clark
Liberty Media
Loews
Markel
Marsh & McLennan
Mastercard
Microsoft
Mohawk Indus.
Morningstar
Nestlé

Netflix
NVR
O’Reilly Automotive
PepsiCo
PNC Financial
Post Holdings
Procter & Gamble
Progressive Corporation
Roper Technologies
Seaboard
Sherwin Williams
Sirius
Texas Instruments
Thermo Fisher
TransDigm
Unilever
United Technologies
Verisign
Walmart
White Mountains Ins.
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The following abstract summarizes the various correlation data
discussed at various points throughout the Article. The left column lists the
practice or policy discussed and the right column indicates where in the
Article the related data is discussed in context. Statistics-wise, the first
column gives the number of observations in the respective correlation test,
followed by the number and percent, respectively, of such observations that
were within the top 10%, top 25%, and top 50% of the QSDR.
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Percent Within
QSDR
Top Top Top
10% 25% 50%

Location
in Article

Bd. Diversity—
Race

9

1

8

9

11%

89% 100%

n.227;
TIII.5

Time-Weighted
Voting

5

0

0

5

0%

0% 100%

n.196

Branding

36

13

27

35

36%

75% 97%

n.238:
TIII.8

Trust

49

13

33

45

26%

67% 90%

n. 155

Moat

202

65 127

180

32%

62% 87%

n.237;
TIII.7

Split-Chair

216

37

92

184

16%

40% 85%

n.166

Chair-CEO

234

66 132

197

28%

57% 84%

n.166

Drucker

141

39

76

119

28%

54% 84%

n.91

Bus. R. Table

135

34

74

109

25%

55% 81%

n.92

ESG—Barron’s

47

10

24

38

20%

50% 80%

n.107

ESG--IBD

46

11

23

38

23%

50% 83%

n.107

Capital
Allocation

140

37

79

105

26%

56% 75%

n. 229;
TIII.6

Bd. Diversity-Women

133

19

54

92

15%

40% 70%

n.226;
TIII.4

Dual Class

135

15

41

86

11%

30% 64%

n. 186

Uni/Class Board

n. 193

